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Abstract 
Traceability has played a significant role in numerous product sectors – including food, 
agricultural and fish/seafood products – in assurance of product safety and quality, material origin 
and sustainability attributes. Since 2010, traceability has been adopted and implemented in tin, 
tantalum and tungsten (3T) supply chains to assist in removing conflict-related minerals from 
global supply chains, and ensuring the conflict-free origin of minerals. However, while factors 
impacting traceability in other commodity chains are fairly well studied, those impacting 
traceability in minerals supply chains are unknown. This study aims at understanding the drivers 
that motivate 3T supply chain actors to participate in the industry supply chain system and the 
barriers that inhibit traceability in conflict minerals supply chains in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa, specifically in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). To achieve these objectives, 
a grounded theory approach was employed. Primary data were collected using semi-structured 
interviews with ten key informants holding high ranking positions in various organizations within 
and outside the physical supply chain. Collected data were analyzed inductively via coding. The 
study identified three drivers that motivate participation in traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC, 
with market access being mentioned more often than legal requirement and social pressure. The 
study found that barriers to traceability of conflict minerals in the DRC are institutional, contextual 
and people-related. According to the informants, the most significant institutional barriers involve 
government and the industry traceability system, with the DRC government being the biggest 
barrier to traceability of 3T minerals due to its weak governance over minerals trade, which is 
epitomized in the deficient monitoring system of mine sites, trade routes, and trading points, weak 
legal system and corruption. In addition, among the ten barriers identified, four are unique to 
conflict minerals traceability, which constitutes the originality of this study. This research 
contributes to the literature on traceability on two fronts. First, it fills the knowledge gap in 
commodity traceability literature. Second, this research opens new grounds for research in 
traceability of minerals. Moreover, this study provides significant recommendations that can be 
used to improve traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC. 
Key Words: traceability, conflict mineral, driver, barrier, opportunity, improvement, 3T minerals, 
chain of custody. 
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: Introduction 
1.1 Background and context 
Minerals and the metals they contain are ubiquitous in everyday life. They are essential to various 
industries such as electronics, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and cosmetics. In order to 
be used in industries, minerals are extracted from mines, processed into metals and traded in 
complex global supply chains. This results in challenges to tracing minerals back to their origin. 
Further, it is acknowledged that the exploitation, processing, and trade of minerals may be 
associated with social, economic, environmental issues and armed conflict (Azpagic, 2004). Such 
is the case with conflict minerals supply chain, the focus of this study. 
1.1.1 Conflict Minerals 
Conflict minerals refer to four minerals and/or the metals that are extracted from them: cassiterite 
(tin), columbite-tantalite (tantalum), which is colloquially known as “coltan” in DRC, wolframite 
(tungsten) and gold, known to be illegally exploited and traded, and thus financing armed conflicts 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012).  
For over 20 years, conflict minerals have been illegally exploited and traded to fund and sustain 
armed conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, specifically in the Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Nzambo-ko-Atumba, 2004; Onana, 2009; Onana, 2012; UN Security 
Council, 2002). It has been established that armed conflicts in the region are waged by an elite 
network that is controlled by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (Nzambo-ko-Atumba, 2004). This elite 
network refers to various interest groups including armed groups, businessmen, criminal groups, 
local politicians, neighboring states and multinational firms engaged in illegal trade of minerals 
(UN Security Council, 2002).   
There is strong evidence that illicit trade in minerals has sustained armed conflicts in the region 
from 1996 onward.  In 1999, for example, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) Congo Desk that 
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controlled most of the armed groups involved in illegal minerals trade contributed $320 million to 
the Rwandan military expenses (UN Security Council, 2002). In addition, in 2008, trade in conflict 
minerals was estimated to have contributed $184.4 million to armed groups: $115 million from 
cassiterite, $12 million from coltan, $7.4 million from wolframite and $50 million in profit from 
gold (BSR, 2010). For instance, estimates for 2010 suggest that the Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) that controlled Bisie mine in North Kivu, the 
largest cassiterite mine in the region, earned approximately $2.4 million a month and $28.8 million 
a year from 2006-2009 via the illicit exploitation and trade in minerals. These earnings were 
collected from on-site minerals trade at the mine, and from taxes on diggers and on porters (Global 
Witness, 2010).  
Notably, conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of electronics and many 
other high-tech products, such as computers and cellphones (Resolve, 2010; US SEC, 2012). An 
overview of conflict minerals description, production, industry uses and global production is 
displayed in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1. Overview of 3T minerals description.  
Source: Based on data compiled from Prendergast & Lezhnev (2009); BSR (2010); Share (2012); 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (2013); USGS (2016). 
 
Mineral Description Uses Global Production of 
primary metal (2016) 
Cassiterite 
(Tin) 
Symbol: Sn  Solder on circuit boards 
for electronics (44%) 
 Solder on industrial 
applications (8.8%) 
 Tinplate (16.4%) 
 Chemicals (13.9%) 
 Float glass (2.1%) 
 China (42%) Indonesia 
(20%) Peru (11%) Bolivia 
(8%) Brazil (4%) Australia 
(4%) Burma (3%) 
 DRC (6-8%) 
Columbite-
tantalite 
(Coltan) 
(Tantalum) 
 Symbol: Ta 
 Mixture of 2 
minerals: Niobium & 
tantalite 
 Ta is ductile, highly 
resistant to corrosion 
by acids, good 
conductor of heat & 
electricity; has a 
high melting point 
 
 Electronic components: 
(e.g., capacitors in 
cellphones, pagers, heart 
pacemakers, computers, 
videogames, automotive 
electronics (65-80%)) 
 Super alloys for jet engine 
and turbine components 
(10%) 
 
 Australia (2%)  
Brazil (21%)  
Canada (2%) 
China (8%),  
Mozambique (10%) 
 DRC (15-20%)  
 
Wolframite 
(Tungsten) 
 Symbol: W 
 Tungsten has the                   
highest melting point 
& the highest tensile 
strength at 
temperatures over 
1650˚C 
 Carbide tools 
 Cellphone vibration 
application 
 Filaments in light bulbs 
 Turbines for jet engines 
 China, Russia, Brazil, 
USA, India, Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam  
 DRC (2-4%) 
Gold  Symbol: Au   China, Australia, Russia, 
US, Peru, Canada, South 
Africa, Mexico 
 
Mineral ores illegally extracted in the Eastern DRC conflict-affected and high-risk areas are easily 
smuggled out to adjoining countries, such as Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Kenya, 
where they are traded and exported, to East Asia – specifically to China – and then to the rest of 
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the world via legal channels (Bleischwitz et al. 2012); BSR, 2010; Global Witness, 2010; 
Prendergast & Lezhnev, 2009) (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. Illicit 3T minerals supply chains.  
From Bukavu and Kivu, minerals are smuggled across the border mainly to Rwanda where they 
are exported throughout the world as material originating in Rwanda. Source: Prendergast & 
Lezhnev (2009). 
 
The link between armed conflict and minerals trade is well established (UN Security Council, 
2002). Concerns arising from the conflict minerals phenomenon and their implications are 
presented in Table 1.2. Armed groups are known to illegally control mine sites and trade routes, 
and collect taxes on mineral resources (BSR, 2010; EICC & GeSI, 2011). According to Nathan & 
Sakar (2010), before the implementation of traceability in 2010, twelve of the thirteen mine sites 
in Eastern DRC were controlled by armed groups. As shown in Table 1.2, conflict minerals 
exploitation and trade involves social issues such as serious human right abuses, which include 
slave and child labor, widespread sexual and gender-based violence, and loss of lives exceeding 
six million (Enough Project, 2014; Levin et al., 2013; Share, 2012).  
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Table 1.2. Links between minerals trade, armed conflict, and related concerns and impacts  
(Enough Project, 2014; Hayes & Burge, 2003; Prendergast & Lezhnev, 2009). 
Major Concerns       Implications 
(1) Link between armed conflict and 
minerals trade 
 Funding of armed groups 
 Army’s control over mines & trade 
routes 
 Conflict minerals traded in global 
supply chains 
(2) Social concern  Serious human rights abuses 
 Hazardous working conditions 
(3) Economic concern  Tax evasion 
 Poor price on minerals/Poor wages 
(4) Environmental concern  Biodiversity loss 
 Water pollution 
 Devastation of fauna & flora 
 
Although the Eastern Congo houses invaluable minerals, the region and its populations do not 
benefit economically from minerals trade. The DRC in general, and mining communities in 
particular, are not well off, because miners are price takers, and elite networks pay taxes to armed 
groups. Illegally collected taxes at mine sites and trade points are roughly estimated at $500 million 
(Koning, 2011). Miners receive unreasonably small prices for their minerals, and are paid low 
wages amounting to $1-5 a day (Hayes & Burge, 2003), which is below minimum wage. Moreover, 
according to Global Witness (2010) conflict minerals trade is characterized by tax evasion as 
minerals mined in the DRC are traded and exported from neighboring countries.   
Mineral exploitation and trade also has an adverse impact on the rainforest, environment and its 
ecosystems (Bleischwitz et al., 2012). Previous studies indicated that Artisanal and Small Scale 
Mining (ASM), which is the principal mode of conflict mineral exploitation, does not observe 
basic environmental standards (Bleischwitz et al., 2012). Mining activities taking place in the 
Congo basin environment result in land disturbance and degradation, deforestation, biodiversity 
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loss, and watersheds pollution (Hart & Mwinyhali, 2001, UN Security Council, 2007). For 
example, Virunga and Kahuzi-Biega parks, both World Heritage sites, have been overrun to extract 
minerals that only profit armed groups, and business actors down the chain (Draulans & 
Krunkelsven, 2002).  
1.1.2 International and Regional Responses to the Conflict Minerals Problem 
In response to illicit exploitation and trade in conflict minerals, international and regional laws, 
regulations and initiatives have been developed and implemented to support transparent and 
“conflict-free supply chains”1 (OECD, 2013; Taka, 2016). Initiatives will be presented in order of 
importance. 
International Initiatives: Since 2007, a number of international initiatives have been developed 
in support of supply chain due diligence practices, including transparency on 3T minerals origin. 
These initiatives include regulatory frameworks, such as the UN Due “diligence guidelines”2 by 
Group of Experts (GoE); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Due 
Diligence Guidance (OECD DDG); the Dodd-Frank Act 1502 (DFA); and industry-driven 
initiatives, including Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP) and ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(ITSCi). Except for Dodd-Frank Act, which can be enforced in law, all regulatory frameworks and 
initiatives are voluntary, relying solely on a sense of responsibility and moral obligation (Geenen, 
2015). The following is an overview of some of the most significant regulations and initiatives. 
                                                     
1 Conflict-free minerals supply chain refers to the mineral chain that is free from support for non-state armed groups 
or public or private security forces who: (a) “illegally control mine sites or otherwise control transportation routes, 
points where minerals are traded and upstream actors in the supply chain”; (b) “illegally tax or extort money or 
minerals at points of access to mine sites, along transportation routes or at points where minerals are traded”; and/or 
(c) “illegally tax or extort intermediaries, export companies or international traders” (OECD, 2013). 
2 Due diligence refers to “the process through which enterprises can identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how 
they address their actual and potential adverse impacts as an integral part of business decision-making and risk 
management systems” (OECD, 2008). 
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The UN Due diligence guidelines for responsible supply chains. The UN was the first 
international body to call for due diligence in conflict minerals supply chains. In support of 
conflict-free and traceable minerals, the UN Security Council mandated the GoE on the DRC to 
draft recommendations for the exercise of due diligence by downstream supply chain industries 
regarding the sourcing, purchase, acquisition, and processing of minerals originating from the 
DRC. The GoE thus produced a five-step due diligence guideline (UN Security Council, 2009), 
which was later on carried and formalized in the OECD DDG. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Due Diligence Guidance. Created in 
1961, OECD is an international organization that promotes policies aimed at improving economic 
and social well-being around the world. In support of responsible supply chain of minerals from 
conflict-affected and high-risk areas, the OECD in 2010 formalized the due diligence guidelines 
initiated by UN GoE into Due Diligence Guidance (DDG) as a tool designed to assist sourcing 
firms to exercise due diligence in their supply chains. The OECD DDG framework consists of five 
components (OECD, 2013) as outlined in Table 1.3. 
Although OECD DDG is primarily intended to assist companies in exercising supply chain due 
diligence, it is equally useful for voluntary initiatives and programs designed to address conflict 
minerals supply chain concerns, such as CFSP and iTSCi (OECD, 2013). These industry-led 
initiatives help downstream firms, especially smelters and refines avoid material from conflict 
sources. A recent study by Achebe (2016) shows that there is a significant increase in 3T minerals, 
specifically tantalum, sourced from conflict-free sources via compliant smelters and refiners. 
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Table 1.3. OECD DDG five-step framework.  
Key aspects Tasks 
(1) Internal management systems Restructure firms’ internal management 
systems to include policies that support 
supply chain due diligence, including 
traceability of origin. 
(2) Risk assessment 
 
 
(3) Risk mitigation 
Identify and assess supply chain risk that 
sustains the link between minerals trade and 
conflict. 
Address identified risks accordingly. 
 
(4) Independent third-party audit 
(5) Disclosure/Reporting 
Audit firms due diligence effort. 
Firms to disclose to the public the steps 
undertaken to avoid trading in conflict 
minerals. 
 
The US legislation Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) section 1502. The DFA act was signed into law in 
2010 by President Obama to enhance conflict minerals supply chain transparency and support 
conflict-free sourcing (US SEC, 2010). The DFA via the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) determines a set of requirements to be satisfied by all US firms registered with the SEC, 
and involved in the manufacture of products where conflict minerals are necessary. These 
manufacturing industries include electronics and communications, aerospace, automotive, 
jewelry and industrial products (Table 1.1). Firms are required to: 
(a) Disclose annually whether conflict minerals necessary to the products they manufacture 
originate from the DRC or adjoining countries; 
(b) Report on due diligence measures undertaken to determine/identify the source and the 
chain of custody (CoC) of conflict minerals in their supply chains; 
(c) Name the auditors of their reports;  
(d) Describe all facilities used to process conflict minerals used in their products;  
(e) Determine the country of origin of conflict minerals;  
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(f) Describe efforts to determine the mine of origin of conflict minerals with the greatest 
possible specificity. 
 
Unidentified and undocumented minerals exploited and traded in the context of armed conflict 
make their way into global supply chains, where they end up in various industries. The increasingly 
growing focus on removing conflict-related minerals from the global supply chain, and the 
requirement to identify the conflict-free origin of minerals produced in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa, resulted in the need to implement traceability in 3T minerals supply chain (Melcher et al. 
(2008). The need for traceability in the conflict minerals supply chain led to the development and 
implementation of various programs. These include the Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP), at 
the smelter level; ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCi) the traceability scheme for 3T minerals 
operating in the region; and Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM). 
Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP). The CFSP is one of the Conflict-Free Smelter Initiative 
(CFSI) tools used to address the conflict minerals issue. Launched in 2010, the CFSP operates as 
a tool for evaluating and providing third-party assurance on the plausibility of the conflict-free 
status of origin of materials sourced by compliant smelters/refiners (Young et al., 2014). The CFSP 
is the largest industry-led program to address conflict minerals, as its scope includes tin, tungsten, 
tantalum and gold smelters worldwide. The CFSP uses independent third-party audit to identify 
and validate smelters/refiners sourcing exclusively conflict-free products via audit protocols and 
procedures (CFSI, 2013). CFSI was established in 2008 under the leadership of the Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI). CFSI is 
an industry-led multi-sector nexus, which includes the Automotive Industry Action Group 
(AIAG), the Japanese Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association (JEITA), 
and the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA). CFSP focuses on the upstream supply chain 
from mine to smelter, with a specific interest in smelters/refiners. Another initiative focusing on 
the upstream supply chain is iTSCi, with a particular interest in helping upstream actors to trade 
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in 3T minerals that are traceable to a conflict-free origin. This initiative including the status of the 
current traceability will be explored in subsection 1.1.3. 
Regional Initiative. The Regional Initiative against illegal exploitation of Natural Resources 
(RINR) is a legal framework developed by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) member states to address the issue of illegal exploitation of resources, including conflict 
minerals (PAC, 2015). Each member state has the responsibility to adopt and enforce this legal 
framework. Created in 2006 by the ICGLR member states, and launched in 2010, the RINR 
initiative aims at disentangling the link between minerals trade and armed conflict (Stream House, 
2014).  
The Regional Certification Mechanism. The RCM is one of the six tools of the RINR (Stream 
House, 2014), developed to obliterate the primary source of funding for conflict in the region. The 
six tools include:  
1) RCM for natural resources;  
2) Harmonization of national legislation in ICGLR member states;  
3) Regional database on mineral flows;  
4) Formalization of the artisanal mining sector; 
5) Promotion of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) peer learning mechanism; 
 6) Whistle-blowing mechanism.  
Consistent with the OECD DDG for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas, the RCM is aimed at supporting conflict-free and sustainable supply chains 
by ensuring that mine sites, trade routes and export channels are free from the predatory control of 
armed groups (ICGLR, n.d). The ICGLR’s RCM is composed of four key components (Table 1.4). 
The objective of the RCM is to ensure transparency on minerals origin, verification of CoC 
compliance, and monitoring of regional supply chains (ICGLR, n.d.). 
  
11 
 
Table 1.4. Regional Certification Mechanism key components and tasks. 
RCM key components            Task 
(1) Minerals tracking from mine to     
export 
 Mine site inspection and classification as 
green, yellow or red. 
 Implement traceability & Due diligence.                    
 Certify minerals for export. 
(2) Data management & Exchange via 
ICGLR database 
 iTSCi to share information with member 
states . 
 Member states to share information with   
ICGLR, which tracks mineral flows in-
country and across the region. 
(3) Independent third-party audits  Audit supply chain actors. 
(4) ICGLR independent mineral chain 
auditor 
 
 Act as regional inspector general. 
 Conduct ongoing monitoring and 
investigation as needs arise. 
 Make public reporting. 
 
DRC government initiative. In 2012, the DRC government enacted legislation requiring mining 
and mineral trade firms operating in the country to implement supply chain due diligence in line 
with OECD DDG (Global Witness, 2012). 
To date, CFSP and iTSCi, which are industry-driven, are the most prominent initiatives currently 
implicated in the process of assisting upstream and downstream firms to exercise due diligence in 
their supply chains. CFSP operates at the pinch point – that is, at smelters’ level – whereas iTSCi 
operates at origin, the Great Lakes Region of Africa. 
1.1.3 Status of Traceability Implementation in 3T Minerals Supply Chain 
Traceability of 3T minerals as currently implemented in the DRC involves two different 
institutions: the DRC government and iTSCi. The traceability scheme is owned by ITRI, but 
operated in collaboration with the DRC government, with the technical assistance of Pact. Pact is 
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the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) partner for traceability implementation on the 
ground (Pact, 2015). ITSCi was created in 2009 by ITRI, and launched in 2010 in South Kivu, 
before the DFA, to assist the tin industry to satisfy supply chain due diligence requirements, and 
to document the conflict-free origin of minerals they purchase (Pact, 2015; Roesen & Levin, 2011). 
ITSCi is, by design, an industry-based traceability system operating in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa, whose aim is to help deter conflict minerals from the supply chain and help business actors 
across 3T minerals supply chain, especially smelters, demonstrate that the materials they are 
sourcing from the region originate from traceable conflict-free mine sites (Stream House, n.d).  
Presently, 231 firms participate in the iTSCi traceability system. Participating members include 
cooperatives, international traders, and smelters. As of a 2015 estimate, 39,622 miners participate 
and sell tagged materials in the DRC (Pact, 2013). The iTSCi system operates in the Eastern DRC, 
which includes the provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu, and the Oriental 
Province. Out of 366 active “mine sites”3 that were identified and characterized, 338 mines, that 
is 92.1%, have been qualified conflict-free; 16 of the 366 identified mine sites (4.8%) are yellow 
flagged, and not validated conflict-free; 11 of the 366 identified mines (3.1%) are red flagged, as 
result they are not qualified conflict-free (Ministères des Mines & Coopération Allemande, 2016; 
Pact, 2015). Processes and structure of the current 3T minerals traceability supply chain is 
portrayed in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
                                                     
3 A mine site is either a concession or a designated area/sector, which includes numerous pits. Each mine site has a 
tagging point where mineral ores are washed, weighed and tagged. For the purpose of this study, the mine of origin 
refers to the site where minerals are mined, washed, first weighed and tagged. 
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Figure 1.2. Status of 3T minerals traceability supply chain.  
This diagram delineates the current supply chain structure, and traceability implementation in 3T 
minerals. The system uses direct (i.e., miners/cooperatives, local traders, exporters and smelters), 
and indirect supply chain actors (i.e., intermediary traders (I.T.) and intermediary comptoirs 
(I.C.). Minerals are tracked from qualified mine sites to export through local traders; and can be 
traced from smelter to the mine of origin using CoC documentation.  
 
Before traceability implementation takes place, the mine site must be qualified as conflict-free. 
This operation is carried out by the “Joint Mine Site Validation Missions”4 led by the DRC 
government (Ministères des Mines & Coopération Allemande, 2016). Identified mines are 
                                                     
4 Members of the Joint Mine Site Validation Missions include: Provincial Mining Ministry, Provincial Mining 
Division, SAESSCAM, CAMI, Mining Police, Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), 
PACT/iTSCi, Mission de l’Organization des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUSCO), Federation des Entreprises du 
Congo (FEC), Civil Society. 
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characterized as green, yellow or red. The green flagged pointers indicate mines that are qualified 
for traceability. The yellow flagged pointers show non-qualified mine sites, but with the possibility 
to produce materials for certified export. The red flagged pointers indicate non-qualified mine sites 
that are banned from producing materials. Mine sites that are characterized green are qualified 
conflict-free through a ministerial order issued by the Ministry of Mines. Once the process of 
characterization and qualification is completed, the DRC Ministry of Mines shares the status of 
mine sites with iTSCi (Ministères des Mines & Coopération Allemande, 2016).   
As shown in the actual supply chain structure depicted in Figure 1.2., there are three main stages 
in the upstream supply chain of 3T minerals: mine site, trading house/negociant, and comptoir 
exporter. At mine site, miners are expected to have a miner’s card issued by the DRC government. 
At the negociant level, official traders are to be registered with the DRC government and hold a 
trader’s license issued by the DRC government. At the export level, exporters must be approved 
by the ministry of mines as processing entity. Thus, without this approval, exporters cannot legally 
purchase minerals in the DRC. Moreover, there are intermediaries involved between each stage. 
In most cases, intermediaries operate without being registered with the DRC government. At the 
negociant level, intermediaries operate under a licensed trader. At the comptoir export level, 
intermediaries operate under an exporter license and iTSCi membership.  
In the iTSCi traceability system, supply chain actors (i.e., miners/cooperatives, traders, and 
exporters) do not have the capacity to identify and document materials in their possession (Pact, 
2015). Moreover, ITSCi does not identify nor document mineral flows either. The major role of 
ITSCi is to ensure that mine sites are conflict-free and comply with due diligence requirements 
(i.e., slave and child labor, the environment, health hazards, presence of armed groups) via baseline 
study of mines, and the analysis, management, and transfer of data/information. The main 
responsibility for the implementation of traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC lies with the DRC 
government. 
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Ground operations pertaining to traceability implementation are carried out by the DRC 
government via three main services (Pact, n.d.). These services are: Service d’Assistance et 
d’Encadrement de Small Scale and Artisanal Mining (SAESSCAM), Division des Mines, and 
Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification (CEEC) (IPIS, 2012; Pact, 2013). The DRC 
government agents, trained by Pact, are responsible for tagging and data collection. The current 
system employs two types of tags: mine tag and negociant tag, which are affixed on bags of 
minerals at the first two stages of the chain (i.e., at mine site and at negociant/trader) (IPIS, 2012; 
Pact, n.d.). As shown in Figure 1.3., each tag has a unique bar code number that is manually 
recorded in a uniquely numbered logbook. Data manually recorded are scanned and uploaded into 
the iTSCi database housed in London (Pact, n.d.), where traceability data are analyzed and 
managed. Three types of logbooks are used: mine logbooks, negociant logbooks and exporter 
logbooks. At the mine site, traceability data are recorded in the mine site logbook by the 
SAESSCAM agent; at the trading house, traceability data are recorded in the negociant logbook 
by an agent from the Division des Mines; at export, traceability data are recorded in the comptoir 
export logbook by an agent from the CEEC (Pact, n.d.). Required traceability data recorded in the 
logbooks are described in Table 1.5. 
 
Figure 1.3. Manual data recording/Paper-based system. Source: iTSCi (2012).  
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Table 1.5. Data to be recorded at each stage of the supply chain (IPAD, 2010; IPIS, 2012).  
This shows how the CoC in 3T minerals supply chain is documented. 
 
At mine site                                   At trading house                                  At Comptoir exporter 
Mineral’s trade name Mineral’s tarde name Mineral’s trade name 
Mine site’s name Trader’s name Exporter’s name 
Mine site location Mine tag number Negociant tag number 
Miner/Cooperative Supplier’s name Supplier’s name 
Production method Date  Date 
Mine tag number Time Time 
Date Weigh-in Weigh-in 
Time Grade Grade 
Weight Price Price 
Grade Weigh-out Weigh-out 
Price Loss/gain Loss/gain 
Transport method Transport method Export number 
Transport route Transport route Transport method 
Transporter Transporter Transport route 
Vehicle plate number Vehicle plate number  Transporter 
Security onsite Security onsite  Security onsite 
Taxes paid Taxes paid  Taxes paid 
Buyer’s name Up next buyer’s name Smelter’s name 
   
Concerning the cost of running the system, iTSCi traceability is mainly funded by the upstream 
industry via levy, which is paid on material tonnage. According to the estimates of 2014, 81 % of 
implementation cost was funded by the upstream industry, 16% by donors and less than 2% by 
downstream industry. The cost of traceability implementation includes field activities, data 
collection, reporting and auditing (ITSCi, 2016). 
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To summarize, implementation of traceability in 3T minerals in the DRC involves two main 
parties: iTSCi/Pact and the DRC government. ITSCi owns the system, but does not implement 
traceability of minerals on the ground. ITSCi is responsible for ensuring that mine sites are 
qualified for traceability, plus data analysis, data management and sharing. Pact is the 
implementing hand of iTSCi on the ground, as they provide technical assistance to the DRC 
government (i.e., training, guidance). Traceability of 3T minerals is implemented by the DRC 
government through three main services: SAESSCAM, Division des Mines and CEEC. The 3T 
minerals traceability supply chain goes from qualified mine site to export. This chain is officially 
structured in three stages: mine site, trading point, and comptoir export. However, in practice, the 
negociants/traders do not go to the mine sites: they use intermediaries to purchase the material. 
This phenomenon is also present at the comptoir export. Exporters do not deal with local traders, 
they use instead intermediaries who are identified as “comptoir agréé”. Concerning participation 
in traceability, the vast majority of miners in the DRC Eastern provinces sell tagged material. In 
the same way, exporters and local traders participate in the iTSCi traceability scheme. However, 
the drivers for participation and barriers to traceability across the upstream supply chain are as yet 
unknown.  
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: Literature Review 
The purpose of this review is to examine academic literature on traceability and related concepts 
of product supply chains. Additionally, it seeks to find how past studies addressed the factors 
impacting traceability in product supply chains. The literature review will focus on three main 
areas identified as important to address the research objectives of this study: 1) traceability; 2) 
chain of custody; and 3) drivers and barriers to traceability in food, agricultural, and fish/seafood 
product supply chains. 
2.1 Concept of Traceability 
At its most basic level, traceability involves a traceable item – referring to a physical object that 
may require the retrieval of recorded information about its attributes (i.e., history, application or 
location) at a later time (GS1, 2007). The concept of traceability and its use is confusing, 
ambiguous and/or contradictory in literature (Olsen & Borit, 2013; Sterling & Chiasson, 2014). 
While the concept of traceability is widely used and accepted across product supply chains, 
scholars are far from embracing a common understanding of what traceability means (Karlsen et 
al., 2013; Olsen & Borit, 2013; Van Dorp, 2002). 
Traceability first emerged in the 1930s in Europe to prove the origin of high-quality food such as 
French champagne (UN Global Compact, 2014). Recently, the need to implement traceability has come 
up to address issues pertaining to commodity concerns such as transparency of supply chain, 
identification of a commodity’s origin and inputs, food safety and quality (GS1, 2006; Meuwissen 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, some scholars relate the importance of traceability to the need to 
document CoC, production practices, and comply with regulatory requirements (Thakur & 
Hurburgh, 2009). The literature review provides an overview of some prominent definitions of 
traceability. 
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ISO 9000 (2000) describes traceability as “the ability to track forward the movement through 
specified stage(s) of the extended supply chain and trace backward the history, application or 
location of that which is under consideration”. ISO’s definition introduces two key terms, namely, 
tracking forward and tracing backward, which are considered critical factors towards achieving 
complete and effective product traceability (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Van Dorp, 2003; 
Young et al., 2008/2010). However, ISO does not indicate what tracking forward entails and what 
allows for identifying the item/product attribute, including origin, at a later time. Other scholars 
have expanded on the understanding of traceability. 
Sterling and Chiasson (2014, p.7)  define traceability more specifically as “the ability to identify 
the origin of the product and sources of input materials, as well as the ability to conduct backward 
and forward tracking using recorded information to determine the specific location and life history 
of the product”. Olsen and Borit (2013, p. 148), for their part, describe traceability as “the ability 
to access any or all information relating to that which is under consideration, throughout its entire 
life cycle, by means of recorded identifications”. This definition focuses on the importance of 
recorded information, which allows for the capture of an item/product’s history. Tracking is 
defined as the ability to follow the path forward of an item and determine its localization from one 
or several criteria as it moves downstream in the direction of life cycle flow through the supply 
chain (Bechini et al., 2005; Bechini et al., 2008; Young & Dias, 2011). Conversely, tracing works 
backward, and refers to the ability, in every point of the supply chain, to determine the origin and 
characteristics of a product based upon one or more given criteria (Bechini et al., 2005; Bechini et 
al., 2008; Young & Dias, 2011). In line with Sterling and Chiasson (2014), several authors argue 
that for a traceability system to be complete, it must be able to address both tracking forward and 
tracing backward (Bechini et al., 2005; Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Jansen-Vullers et al., 2003; 
Van Dorp, 2003).  
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2.1.1 Traceability in Supply Chain  
Supply chain traceability consists of two essential components: internal and external traceability 
(Figure 2.1.). Internal traceability refers to traceability data recording that takes place at each step 
of the chain where a traceability participant/partner receives a traceable product/item as input that 
is subjected to internal processes before it becomes output. Internal processes may include 
movement, transformation, storage, usage or destruction (GS1, 2007). On the other hand, external 
traceability refers to the process where a traceable product/item is physically handed over to the 
next/direct traceability participant/partner (GS1, 2007). Thus, to achieve full supply chain 
traceability, all supply chain traceability participants must assume their responsibilities pertaining 
both to internal and external traceability (GS1, 2007; Hu et al., 2013). The main responsibility of 
each supply chain actor is to ensure the recording of relevant information about the material in 
their custody. 
 
Figure 2.1. Description of internal and external traceability. Source: GS1 (2007). 
2.1.2 Traceability Models 
Application of traceability models is of great value in product supply chains “…as they provide 
structure and rules that enable the assurance of provenance of products” (Young et al., 2013, p.4). 
Three main traceability models are commonly used in terms of how traceability systems track and 
  
21 
 
trace materials’ attributes or sustainability claims: physical segregation, mass-balance, and book-
and-claim (Chainpoint, n.d.; Golan et al., 2005; IPIECA Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller 
Consulting, 2010; ISEAL Alliance, 2012; UN Global Compact, 2014). These models are explained 
below. 
Physical segregation: in this traceability model, certified materials are physically separated from 
non-certified materials at each stage along the supply chain (Chainpoint, n.d.; Golan et al., 2014; 
IPIECA Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller Consulting, 2010; ISEAL Alliance, 2012; UN Global 
Compact, 2014). Importantly, the physical segregation model requires that every supply chain 
actor having custody of a sustainable product be certified, and demonstrate the ability to manage 
data, accounting, documentation and related processes involved in acquisition/purchase and 
disposition/sale of sustainable/certified products (IPIECA Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller 
Consulting, 2010). This is only applicable to supply chains where actors are responsible for 
traceability implementation (i.e., food, agricultural, and fish/seafood products supply chains), 
unlike in conflict minerals, where traceability is implemented by institutions. The UN Global 
Compact outlines two physical segregation models to traceability: identity preservation (Figure 
2.2.  and bulk commodity physical segregation (Figure 2.3.) (UN Global Compact, 2014).  
Identity preservation: materials of each identifiable sustainable origin are kept separate from those 
of different origins as described in Figure 2.2. Even products produced according the same 
sustainability standards cannot be mixed through the entire supply chain (Chainpoint, n.d.; UN 
Global Compact, 2014). This model guarantees traceability of origin of materials.  
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Figure 2.2. Identity preservation to ensure traceability of origin of material. 
Source: Chainpoint (n.d.). 
Bulk commodity physical segregation: Segregation model requires separation of certified from 
non-certified materials, but allows for mixing of certified materials from different origins. 
Although all origins comply with the certification standards (UN Global Compact, 2014), this 
model does not guarantee a high level of precision on the origin of each comingled material (Golan 
et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 2.3. Bulk commodity physical segregation model.  
Sustainable material from different certified origins can be mixed. Source: Chainpoint (n.d.). 
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The segregation model is employed in organic produce industries, such as cotton, where produce 
from organic and non-organic farms are strictly segregated. However, organic cotton from 
different farms and producers are mixed for the purpose of making up a sizeable lot.  This model 
can be applied to conflict minerals where the identification of origin and product differentiation 
are the main attributes to preserve. In applying this model, small quantities of material from 
different miners and qualified mines can be mixed to form a sizeable lot. However, the 
identification of the exact mine of origin would not be guaranteed. Physical segregation is the ideal 
model, as it allows to trace materials back to farm, fishery or mine of origin. However, the 
implementation of this model can be resource and cost intensive, as it requires the strict separation 
of all material origins and high monitoring and control at each step of the supply chain, which in 
turn necessitates advanced technology and human resources (Global Compact, 2014). 
Mass-balance: as shown in Figure 2.4., the mass-balance traceability model allows for materials 
from sustainable and unsustainable origins to be mixed and flow together across the chain. 
However, exact accounting of volume ratios is required in order to ensure that the quantity of  
certified products produced are equivalent to the volume ratio of sustainable materials sold 
(Chainpoint, n.d.; UN Global Compact, 2014). The mass-balance traceability model allows for the 
volume ratios/quantity of certified materials to be tracked through the supply chain (IPIECA 
Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller Consulting, 2010); however, it does not guarantee traceability 
of certified materials back to their origins (Chainpoint, n.d.). Moreover, to ensure proper 
administration of documentation systems and processes, each supply chain participant taking 
possession of a certified material is required to be certified and registered with the system (IPIECA 
Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller Consulting, 2010). This model is cost effective as it only 
maintains a single stream of products (WWF Global, n.d.).  
Mass-balance is used in product supply chains where segregation is difficult to achieve due to 
either the nature of material or complexity of supply chain. Mass balance is exemplified in the case 
of cocoa beans, where produce from sustainable and unsustainable farms are mixed and flow 
  
24 
 
together across the supply chain. This model is preferred to physical segregation because it is 
inexpensive.  
 
Figure 2.4. Mass-balance traceability model.  
Materials from sustainable and unsustainable origins can be mixed. Source: Chainpoint (n.d.). 
Book-and-claim: in this traceability model, physical materials and sustainability certificates are 
traded separately (WWF Global, n.d.; UN Global Compact, 2014). Material from sustainable and 
unsustainable origins are mixed and flow freely together along the supply chain; and a unique 
certificate with information on the origin is issued to the primary producer for each unit of 
sustainable material (IPIECA Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller Consulting, 2010; UN Global 
Compact, 2014; WWF Global, n.d.). Mixing of material and certification issuance for sustainable 
material is depicted in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5. Book-and-claim traceability model.  
Although material from unsustainable and sustainable sources are mixed, a certificate must be 
issued for sustainable material. Source: Chainpoint (n.d.). 
Attributes of a product are claimed by the supplier using sustainability certificates, traded online 
between the producer at origin and the supplier (UN Global Compact, 2014; WWF Global, n.d.). 
Sustainability certificates sold to the supplier are to be submitted to the issuing body for 
verification; once corresponding units are claimed, certificates are said to be redeemed, and 
therefore can’t be reused (IPIECA Biofuels Task Force & Liz Muller Consulting, 2010). This 
model is much more cost effective in that no paper trail or material physical separation is required 
throughout the supply chain (WWF Global, n.d.). This model is employed in the renewable energy 
production sector, such as solar panels or windmills, where renewable energy is inseparable from 
the conventionally generated energy once in the grid. Upon feeding green energy into an electrical 
grid, the green power producer receives a Renewable Energy Certificate, which is traded with 
suppliers. This certificate is used as proof to claim the purchase of energy from a sustainable 
energy origin (UN Global Compact, 2014). As opposed to physical segregation and mass-balance, 
the book-and-claim traceability model is cost effective as it allows for trade in sustainable 
commodities without the need for segregating and tracing the product across the supply chain.  
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In summary, the definition of traceability is broad and diverse, because traceability is employed as 
tool to achieve specific objectives in varying product supply chains (Golan et al., 2004; Karlsen et 
al., 2013; Moe, 1998). However, there are two core concepts that must be considered to achieve 
traceability in any product supply chain: tracking forward and tracing backward.  Tracking a 
material along the supply chain is an essential operation in traceability, as it allows for 
documentation of CoC via recording of traceable data. Tracing, on the contrary, uses recorded 
information/data to verify the credence of the claimed attributes of a material, including its origin. 
Thus, for the purpose of this study, traceability is defined as the ability to follow and record the 
flow of a mineral product at each stage of the chain, from a qualified mine site to export point, 
which can be used to verify and ascertain minerals’ attributes. Regarding traceability models, what 
makes a specific traceability model preferable to others depends on the type of product under 
consideration and objectives of the program/system. 
2.2   Concept of Chain of Custody  
There are several ways of understanding and defining chain of custody. Giannelli (1982) describes 
CoC as the chronological physical or electronic documentation or paper trail showing the seizure, 
custody, control, transfer and disposition of evidence. Further, Rotherham (1997) argues that CoC 
can be broadly defined as a way to provide a linkage between the forest at origin and a forest 
product at the point of sale. In addition, Kuru et al. (2003) describe CoC as a custodial sequence 
as ownership or control of the product supply is transferred from one custodian to another along 
the supply chain. According to ISEAL Alliance (2014), CoC refers to all stages of the supply chain 
that take possession of the product/material, including manufacturers, exporters, traders and 
importers.  
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2.2.1 Emergence and Application of CoC 
The origin of CoC in scholarly literature is unclear. Explicit application of CoC emerges with the 
work of Giannelli (1983) who applies the concept to legal practice in the process of authentication 
of doubtful evidence. Aside from the judicial context, CoC is used in medicine, museology, 
archival and history of sources or source criticism disciplines. 
The use of CoC to verify and authenticate attributes of articles of evidence is well established in 
legal litigation (Giannelli, 1996). In this context, CoC was first used to demonstrate that the 
evidence presented as true is, indeed, authentic and preserved from any adulterations from the 
point of seizure up to the time of trial in court (Giannelli, 1983). It appears that from the point of 
seizure to the hearing, the evidence passes through several hands/stages that constitute a chain. 
Each officer in the chain has the responsibility to document the evidence in their possession before 
passing it on to the next. 
However, CoC documentation is mainly required in two instances. First, in the event that evidence 
is fungible, due to its predisposition to substitution in whole or in part; second, in case of 
contaminable evidence, which is subject to the risk of being easily tampered with through mixing 
or contact with unwanted material (Giannelli, 1996). Studies by Giannelli (1982/1983/ 1991/1996) 
argue that CoC is a useful tool that allows for the verification of attributes of a fungible or 
contaminable article of evidence using recorded documentation. 
CoC documentation is a common practice in drug testing procedures. In medicine, CoC refers to 
a process that documents specimen and handling from sample collection to the release of 
laboratory results. The purpose of implementing CoC in drug testing is to ensure the integrity and 
authenticity of the specimen. Put simply, the CoC process is used to assure that the specimen 
belongs to the individual whose information appears on the container label, and no post-collection 
adulteration has taken place. To implement CoC in drug testing, four requirements are to be 
satisfied. First, the identification of the specimen collector and of each person who had custody of 
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the specimen. Second, the time of the procedure must be recorded. Third, the recording of routing 
and how the specimen was transported. Fourth, the recording of how and where the specimen was 
stored before analysis (“Chain of Custody for Drug Tests: Origin Diagnostics for Drug Testing”, 
2010). 
In fields such as archival disciplines, source criticism (e.g., history and biblical studies) and 
museology, the authentication of archives, records, sources, documents and collections is 
determined via identification of provenance (Millar, 2002). The term provenance is derived from 
the Latin verb “provenire”, which means “to come from”, or “to originate”. In the archival and 
source criticism contexts, provenance refers to the origin or source of something. Provenance can 
therefore be any individual or organization that created, received, owned or had custody of an item 
under consideration (Pearce-Moses, 2005). In this context, the focus of provenance is on the 
history of the creator, owner, and custodian. However, expanding on the latter viewpoint, Millar 
(2002) argued that provenance must be understood as a combination of creator history, records 
history and custodial history. To preserve the context of production, ownership and custody, the 
principle of provenance suggests that records/documents originating from the same source be kept 
separate from others (Pearce-Moses, 2005).  
In contrast, in the realm of museology, provenance is approached from the viewpoint of pedigree 
and authenticity (Millar, 2002). In this perspective, provenance focuses not on the creator, but on 
the history of the item itself, which is obtained through “archival records, oral histories, sales 
receipts, gallery inventories, and even from the marks on the frame and from the stamps and 
scribbles on the backside of the work itself” (Millar, 2002, p.10).  
In summary, in archival disciplines, source criticism and museology, provenance is determined or 
identified by tracing back the CoC, which is referred to as chain of transfer of ownership and 
possession, location, publication, production or reproduction and display. As noted in the previous 
section, traceability is a bidirectional tool involving forward traceability and backward traceability. 
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CoC is an important aspect of traceability as tool, as it allows for understanding the history of a 
traceable product. For the purpose of this study, CoC is defined as the unbroken trail of actors that 
take possession of a material through primary production, purchase, transportation, handling or 
processing, which is documented via the process of data recording.  
2.3 Identification of Drivers and Barriers to Traceability in the Literature 
This section explores drivers motivating participation, and barriers inhibiting traceability in 
product supply chains. Traceability is adopted and implemented as a tool in food and fish/seafood 
sectors to address specific concerns related respectively with food quality and safety (Manzini & 
Accirsi, 2013; Meuwissen et al., 2003; Moe, 1998; Opara, 2002, Regattieri et al., 2007), and illegal 
fishing (Borit, 2009; Borit & Olsen, 2012; Karlsen et al., 2011). However, Heyder et al. (2010) 
suggest that factors impacting traceability in the food sector are diverse. A summary of factors 
impacting traceability in food, agricultural and fish/seafood product supply chains is provided in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Identified drivers and barriers in the commodity traceability literature  
Commodity Concern Driver Barrier 
Food and  
agricultural 
Products 
Food safety and 
quality 
Counterfeit and 
Fraud 
Adulteration 
Bioterrorism threat 
Animal welfare 
Origin 
Mandatory regulation 
Food safety & quality 
Bioterrorism threats 
Market access & protection 
Chain communication 
Competitive advantage  
Brand protection 
Ensure consumer confidence 
Certification 
Sustainability 
Minimize liability 
Product optimization 
New technology 
Ensure long-term collaboration 
and contracts with customers 
Consumer awareness 
Consumer demand  
Market failure 
Government funding 
Cost 
Complexity of global supply 
chain 
Lack of transparency 
Manual traceability system 
Mixing of raw material 
Lack of technical and 
managerial skills 
Lack of capacity 
Inefficient technology 
Fish/seafood 
products 
Illegal and 
Unreported fishing 
Food safety and  
quality 
Origin  
Mandatory regulation 
Food safety & quality 
Market access  
Chain communication 
Removal of illegal fish from 
the supply chain 
Competitive advantage 
Minimize liability 
Ensure consumer confidence 
Certification 
Sustainability 
Product optimization 
New technology 
Ensure long-term collaboration 
and contracts with customers 
Consumer awareness 
Consumer demand 
Market failure 
Cost 
Complexity of global supply 
chain 
Mislabeling and fraud 
Mixing of raw material 
Lack of transparency 
Inefficient technology 
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2.3.1 Drivers for Traceability in Product Supply Chains 
Previous studies have addressed the drivers that trigger the implementation and participation in 
product supply chains. This subsection identifies factors that drive participation in traceability in 
food, agricultural and fish/seafood product supply chains. In the context of traceability, a driver is 
what causes a system to rise to the challenge faced by the industry. In general terms, drivers are 
outside the system or what is being driven; yet there are also internal drivers, emerging from within 
the system to satisfy internal concerns or objectives (Mattevi & Jones, 2015). A sampling of studies 
featuring drivers for traceability are examined next. 
A study by Xue, Weiwei, Zettan, Peng & Weiguang (2007) on traceability of vegetables in China 
concluded that social pressure, market and Chinese government regulation are the key drivers that 
led to the adoption of traceability in the Chinese vegetable sector. Additionally, the study identified 
social pressure from consumer demand for food safety and quality as the key factor that pressured 
the Chinese government and vegetable sector to shift from quantity to safety and quality. Along 
these lines, Olsen (2009), takes the debate a step further as the study found that traceability 
implementation in food and fish/seafood industries is motivated by seven drivers: 1) legislation, 
which requires implementation of traceability in food supply chains, 2) food safety, which allows 
for firms to perform precision recalls in case of a food safety incident, 3) certification, which 
provides assurance on sustainability attributes of food products, 4) sustainability, which ensures 
better farming practices, 5) competitive advantage, which is achieved by providing customers with 
relevant information on the origin and processing of food and fish/seafood products, 6) labour/cost 
reduction, which is achieved by using internal traceability to achieve various functions within the 
firm, and 7) chain communication, which allows for information exchange within the chain. 
Olsen’s (2009) seven drivers are echoed in further research on drivers for traceability in food 
supply chains. 
Other researchers, such as Karlsen et al. (2013) supported the finding of the study by Olsen. 
Karlsen and others identified ten drivers for traceability in food industry, seven of which were 
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already identified by Olsen. Their findings provide three new drivers, which include: 1) product 
optimization, 2) bioterrorism threats, and 3) welfare. Furthermore, Aung and Chang (2013) sought 
to understand the factors motivating traceability implementation in the food supply chain. The 
study identified eight drivers: 1) legislation, 2) labor/cost reduction, 3) supply chain efficiency, 4) 
supply chain communication, 5) trade globalization, 6) competitive advantage, 7) quality 
assurance, and 8) safety. Another important study was conducted the same year to investigate the 
driving forces behind the implementation of traceability, as well as barriers to it, in the food and 
agricultural supply chain (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013). According the results of this study, five 
major drivers motivate the implementation and participation in traceability of food and agricultural 
product supply chains. These drivers are: 1) food safety and quality, 2) regulation, 3) social 
concern, 4) economic concern, and 5) technological concern. Mandatory regulations are identified 
as enablers for food safety and quality in multiple studies. Food and agricultural product firms 
seek to comply with mandatory regulation requirements to stay in the market (Bosona & 
Gebresenbet, 2013; Mattevi & Jones, 2015; Preziosi et al., 2014). However, besides regulations 
and/or requirements, market is seen as a significant driver.   
In their study of the Greek fresh produce supply chain, Manos and Manikas (2013) examined key 
drivers for traceability implementation. Using semi-structured interviews where twenty-two fresh 
produce firms were interviewed, the results show that the Greek fresh produce firms participation 
in traceability is motivated by two main drivers, notably: 1) to achieve market consolidation, 2) to 
secure long-term collaboration and contracts with customers. Further supporting the assertion of 
economic/market concerns as key drivers, Preziosi (2014) examined the main motivations driving 
traceability implementation and participation in the Italian food supply chain context. The results 
of the study show that five key drivers motivate participation in traceability of food in the Italian 
supply chain: 1) market failure, 2) consumer awareness, 3) mandatory regulation, 4) market 
protection, and 5) optimization of supply chain and operation processes. Likewise, a study by 
Bosona and Gebresenbet (2013) found that firms, in food and agricultural products, participate in 
traceability out of economic interest, motivated by better market access, better prices and 
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government funding. The market and related economic concerns appear to be a significant driver 
towards firms’ participation in traceability. 
In food, agricultural and fish/seafood supply chains, each individual firm in the chain is responsible 
for tracking and managing traceability data/information. This requires efficient technology, which 
is a part of traceability cost. Technology is expensive for small firms to purchase, maintain and 
manage. Some studies found that affordable new technologies, which are cost effective, drive 
participation in supply chain traceability (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Opara & Mazaud, 2001).  
Building upon previous studies, Mattevi and Jones (2015), seek to understand drivers and barriers 
to traceability in food supply chains among the UK small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In their 
study, they classified drivers for traceability into two categories: external and internal drivers. This 
categorization allows better understanding of how drivers affect traceability implementation. In 
the food, agricultural and fish/seafood product supply chains, regulation is seen as the external 
driver that compels supply chain actors to comply with prescribed requirements in order to achieve 
the desired outcome, such as food safety and quality, prevention of counterfeit products, and/or 
deterrence of illegal and unregulated fish (Aung & Chang, 2014; Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013). 
Ultimately, a significant number of researchers in traceability of food, agricultural and fish/seafood 
products identify regulation as a key driver for participation in traceability (Bosona & 
Gebresenbet, 2013; Golan et al., 2004; Mattevi & Jones, 2015; Preziosi et al., 2014). Regulation 
appears to be a dominant external driver. 
Contrary to external drivers, which compel supply chain actors to comply with a set of predefined 
requirements set by an outside organization in order to achieve a goal, internal drivers arise from 
within to address specific needs and objectives of the firm (Aung & Chang, 2014; Mattevi & Jones, 
2015). The findings of Mattevi and Jones’ (2015) study show that there are six internal driving 
forces that motivate participation in food traceability in the UK context: 1) market access, 2) 
enhanced competitiveness, 3) preservation and improvement of brand name, 4) minimization of 
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liability, 5) degree of internationality of supply chain and 6) the degree of complexity of product 
to be traced. Further, several researchers suggest that participation in traceability is mostly driven 
by the firm or supply chain actor’s interest to access or expand into certain markets where 
traceability is required (Bosona and Gebresenbet, 2013; Donnelly and Olsen, 2012). Again, market 
access/economic interest surfaces as a key driver. 
In summary, the literature described a diversity of drivers for participation in traceability in 
different product sectors and contexts. It appears that the nature of the product, supply chain and 
context influence the motivation for participation. However, common threads were found: drivers 
such as product quality and safety, consumer confidence, ensuring long term collaboration and 
contracts with customers, market/economic interest, maximization/optimization of operations, and 
regulation were commonplace. The most powerful driver overall was external: legal 
requirement/regulation emerged as the main motivation for participation in traceability in food, 
agriculture and fishery systems. 
2.3.2 Barriers to Traceability in Product Supply Chains  
While some studies acknowledge that the implementation of traceability in food, agricultural and 
fish/seafood products supply chains has helped firms to ensure food safety and quality, origin and 
product differentiation (Golan et al., 2005: Moe, 1998; Regattieri et al., 2007), other studies have 
shown that there are several barriers facing traceability in these same supply chains (Alfaro & 
Rabade, 2009; Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2003; Golan et al., 2005/2014). Barriers that obstruct 
traceability, include: cost, lack of transparency, lack of capacity, and poor technology. These 
barriers are expanded upon in the following subsections. 
2.3.2.1 Cost 
Costs are a central concern in any business endeavour. Researchers in food, agricultural and 
fish/seafood product supply chains have argued that the implementation of traceability is a cost 
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intensive and complicated undertaking, involving significant investment in equipment, 
maintenance, training and personnel (Alfaro & Rabade, 2009; Aung & Chang, 2014; Bosona & 
Gebresenbet, 2013; Golan et al., 2005/2014; Mattevi & Jones, 2015; Opara & Mazaud, 2001). 
Moreover, Golan et al. (2005) examine traceability in the US food supply chain, concluding that 
the cost of traceability is an additional burden to firms, especially SMEs. Similarly, Regan et al. 
(2012) identified three major costs associated with the implementation of traceability: investment 
in tools, training and labor. This supports the findings of Opara and Mazaud (2001) that training 
and investment in human resources and communications technology presents a major challenge 
for the small scale farmers. However, it is not clear whether the cost affects the implementation of 
traceability in other contexts, where firms are not responsible for data recording and management.  
2.3.2.2 Transparency  
Transparency may be thought of as the ability to freely share and access relevant information. 
Information exchange/sharing in traceability supply chain is an essential characteristic for the 
effectiveness of traceability (Kelepouris et al., 2007; Opara, 2003; Van der Vorst, 2004). Studies 
by Thompson et al. (2005) on seafood traceability in the US, plus studies by Donnelly and Karlsen 
(2010), and Donnelly and Olsen (2012) on traceability of the Norwegian white fish identified lack 
of transparency as a barrier to the traceability of seafood. This finding is supported by several 
studies (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Regattieri et al., 2007; Storoy et al., 2013; Van der Vorst, 
2004). Lack of transparency was explained as a barrier to traceability in terms of lack of 
information dissemination and exchange in the food supply chain due to absence of standardized 
format for data recording among supply chain actors. To address this challenge, some researchers 
proposed the implementation of specific tools, including structured data elenchus, vocabularies 
and ontology (Donnelly et al., 2009). In contrast, to overcome lack of information exchange among 
supply chain actors, Meuwissen et al. (2003) proposed the use of a centralized database where all 
traceability data about, for example, a cow, would be uploaded. It is therefore from this database 
that the cow is tracked forward and traced back to the farm of origin. The advantage of a centralized 
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database model is that it relieves the supply chain actors from having to individually invest in 
information systems that support traceability (Kelepouris, et al., 2007). An accessible, centralized 
database would serve to take pressure off supply chain actors, ensure timeliness and consistency, 
and greatly enhance transparency.   
2.3.2.3 Lack of capacity 
Traceability implementation requires technical and managerial skills; when these skills are absent, 
traceability suffers. Zhang et al. (2010) and Bosona and Gebresenbet (2013) consider the lack of 
capacity as a barrier to traceability in the food and agricultural supply chain. In their analysis, they 
explain lack of capacity in terms of a deficit of well-equipped and trained staff able to assume 
technical and management tasks of traceability. This finding is confirmed in Mattevi & Jones’s 
(2015) recent study of SMEs in the food supply chain.  
2.3.2.4 Mixing of material  
Traceability requires proper identification and documentation to ensure the differentiation of 
product along the supply chain. Some researchers found that traceability of food, agricultural and 
fish product is undermined by the mixing of raw materials in the upstream supply chain, such as 
at production and processing points (Bailey et al., 2016; Bollen et al., 2007). Bollen et al. (2007) 
analyse the role of packing procedures and effects of fruit mixing. They concluded that the mixing 
of fruits during the packing process is a major challenge that undermines effective traceability. 
When batches of fruit from different origins are mixed before they are labeled, one can no longer 
identify where each piece comes from with certainty, nor know what attributes the new mix may 
be expected to have. This finding was supported by a study on traceability in the dried salted fish 
supply chain by Donnelly & Karlsen (2010). Despite that the fish product was identified and 
documented, gaps in traceability data were observed at supply chain links where processing, 
mixing and splitting take place. To improve this, change in management at the packing area was 
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proposed (Bollen et al., 2007). However, the links where unregulated mixing takes place in other 
commodity supply chains are unknown.  
2.3.2.5 Technology 
The tools used to track and document materials make a difference in the success of traceability 
implementation. According to Manos & Manikos (2010), technology plays a significant role in 
product traceability implementation. The more advanced the technology, the better the outcome. 
There is a wide variety of technologies currently used to track and trace products. Traceability 
technologies include paper-based, RFID, and DNA fingerprinting (Moe, 1998; Regattierri et al., 
2007). A paper-based traceability system generally refers to the manual process of identifying and 
tracking a material along the supply chain. Numerous food, agricultural, and fish/seafood product 
supply chains employ a paper-based system to track and document materials. However, several 
studies consider the use of manual traceability as a barrier to effective traceability in the food, 
agricultural and fish/seafood supply chain contexts (Bechini et al., 2005; Regattieri et al., 2007; 
Senneset et al. 2007). A significant number of researchers in traceability of food, agricultural and 
fish/seafood product suggest the implementation of electronic based systems to improve 
traceability outcomes (Moe, 1998; Opara, 2003); Regattieri et al., 2007; Story et al., 2008; Thakur 
& Donnelly, 2010; Thompson et al., 2005). Electronic based systems appear to have many 
advantages over paper-based systems, potentially including ease of recording, transfer and access.  
To summarize, the reviewed studies on traceability in food, agricultural and fish/seafood product 
supply chains revealed multiple and diverse drivers and barriers impacting the implementation and 
participation in traceability of products (Table 2.1.). The present study fits into this debate over 
factors impacting implementation of traceability in product supply chains as it seeks to understand 
drivers and barriers impacting traceability of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  
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2.4 Gap in the Literature 
Reviewed studies show that traceability is implemented in food, agricultural and fish/seafood 
product to address specific concerns, such as food safety, quality and adulteration, illegal fishing 
and mislabeling, and misrepresentation of origin. The reviewed literature shows scholarship 
discussing factors impacting traceability in food, agricultural, and fish/seafood product supply 
chains to understand motivating drivers and barriers to traceability. However, no published studies 
have been found focusing on factors impacting traceability of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa. This study sets out to address this gap, by understanding the drivers and barriers 
to traceability of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region of Africa so as to provide insights on 
policies that would support conflict-free supply chains and ensure conflict-free origin of minerals. 
Additionally, the findings of this research would provide insights to downstream industries seeking 
for assurance on the conflict-free origin of minerals produced in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  
Moreover, this research is important for potential traceability providers who want to improve 
traceability of 3T minerals in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and increase the participation and 
awareness in traceability. This study is also significant for ICGLR in need for strategies to remove 
conflict-related minerals from the supply chain, and ensure conflict-free sourcing of materials. 
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2.5 Purpose and Research Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to understand factors impacting traceability of conflict minerals in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa, in the DRC in particular, and identify potential opportunities for 
improvement. The focus is on conflict minerals because of the increasingly growing need for 
conflict-free “supply chain”5 and assurance on the conflict-free origin of materials (UN GoE, 2011; 
Bleischwitz, 2014).  
To achieve this purpose, the study has two overall objectives: 
1. To identify and examine the drivers that motivate participation in traceability system of 
conflict minerals. 
2. To identify and explain the barriers that inhibit traceability of conflict minerals in the Great 
Lake Region of Africa, and in the DRC in particular. 
  
                                                     
5 A supply chain refers to a network where various businesses including suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and 
retailers acquire raw materials, process raw materials, and deliver final products to retailers (Beamon, 1998; Lambert 
& Cooper, 2000).  
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: Methodology 
The main purpose of this study is to understand the factors impacting traceability of conflict 
minerals in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in the DRC in particular, and identify potential 
opportunities for improvement. Certification of minerals is out of the scope of this study.  
Catanzaro (1988) argues that the selection of research methodology depends on the objective of 
the study. Research methodology is defined as “the general approach the researcher takes in 
carrying out the research project” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001, p. 14). Certainly, some methodologies 
are better suited to address specific research objectives than others. Given that this is an under-
researched topic, without established academic literature, a qualitative, grounded theory (GT), 
semi-structured interview approach was deemed appropriate for this study.  
3.1 The Qualitative Approach 
Corbin & Strauss (2014) indicate that the qualitative approach is a methodology that helps the 
researcher to explore areas/phenomena that are under-researched, and to explore how meanings 
are constructed. Qualitative research can be undertaken using a variety of approaches, which 
include case study, ethnography, content analysis, phenomenology, and GT (Creswell (2012); 
Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001; Williams, 2011). In designing this study, five 
qualitative approaches were considered (Table 3.1). 
All five approaches diverge in focus, outcome, data collection and analysis strategies and sampling 
method. Researchers describe GT as a methodology that uses systematic procedures for data 
collection and analysis to generate an inductively derived theory from data (Charmaz, 2003; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Deriving theory from empirical data draws the demarcation line between 
case study, ethnography, phenomenology and content analysis in one regard, and GT in another. 
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Table 3.1. Characteristics of different qualitative approaches.  
Source: Based on data compiled from Creswell (2013) and Miles & Huberman (1994). 
 
 
To address the objectives of this study, the GT approach was chosen over other qualitative 
approaches as the research specifically focuses on exploring and generating new output from raw 
data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Importantly, given that the area of research of the current study has 
no sufficient prior knowledge, GT was deemed to be a good fit. Along these lines, Creswell (2013) 
argues that GT is a good approach to use when a theory is not readily available to explain a process. 
Therefore, it seemed appropriate for this relatively unique and ground-breaking research endeavor. 
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3.2 Grounded Theory Approach 
The GT approach is a type of qualitative research methodology that was first developed by two 
sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, in 1967 (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Glaser and 
Strauss (1997) hold that GT is an innovative research methodology, as it allows the researcher to 
extract and build a theory/model from data itself. Despite its innovative approach to qualitative 
research, GT methodology proves challenging to use, and consequently raises controversy over 
the use of existing knowledge in a GT study (Dunne, 2011). Thus there is a fundamental concern 
over the place of the literature review in GT research: a number of authors point out that the key 
issue in using GT methodology is not whether to use a literature review in GT research, but rather 
when and how to use it (Cutcliffe, 2000; Dunne, 2011; McGhee et al., 2007). 
While most qualitative approaches of inquiry consider an extensive literature review as an essential 
basis upon which to build a study, Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.37) suggest that: “An effective 
strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of the theory and fact on the area under study”. 
In its seminal state, GT lays out three principles. First, the researcher is advised not to conduct a 
comprehensive literature review in the core area and related areas of the research prior to data 
collection and coding. Second, the researcher should conduct the literature review in substantive 
areas only when data collection and analysis is nearly completed. Third, the result of literature 
review must be woven into theory as data for constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
McCallin (2003) argues that the main concern of keeping out of literature review before 
completing primary research is to prevent the GT researcher to be sidetracked by received 
knowledge and interpretations that corroborate taken-for-granted assumptions that may not be 
relevant in the area under investigation. Similarly, Charmaz (2006) notes that completing a 
literature review after data collection and coding allows the GT researcher to articulate their own 
ideas, and thus avoiding the integration of any preconceived ideas which may alter the research. 
  
43 
 
In contrast, Clarke (2005) argues that the idea to delay or prohibit a literature review in the 
substantive area of research prior to coding is unrealistic and counter-productive, since GT 
research focuses on an area that is under-studied. This study’s methodological approach follows 
Clarke’s perspective, which favors early engagement with existing literature to gain knowledge 
and understanding about the substantive area of research, dismissing the idea that it may 
compromise the fundamental innovative idea to generate new theory from empirical data. The 
integration of existing scholarship/data to help provide information, flesh out concepts, and fuel 
discussion/analysis is critically helpful when the scarcity of relevant research is considered. 
Prior to undertaking data collection through semi-structured interviews, existing literature related 
to traceability of food, agricultural and fish/seafood products was reviewed to identify studies that 
sought to understand factors impacting the implementation of traceability, and  to evaluate what 
knowledge gap existed. However, although primary data were used as a basis for the study, the 
review of literature helped inform the current research with useful concepts that might be 
directional for categorization purposes.  
3.3 Methods 
Research method is described as: “The technique or procedure used to gather and analyze data 
related to some research questions or hypotheses” (Crotty, 1998, p.3). The data collection process 
is seen as a major source of value and effectiveness within the GT approach as it allows researchers 
to build theory from data itself (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). GT research employs various sources 
and types of evidence, including documents, interviews, observations, and videotapes (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). The method used to address the objectives of this study was semi-structured 
interviews.  
The research examines traceability of conflict minerals with specific focus on the 3T minerals 
supply chain. The focus on 3T minerals is due to their potential visibility across the chain, which 
is difficult to establish with materials such as gold. In contrast to gold, which trades in concealable 
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quantity and is easily fused into metal earlier in the supply chain, 3T minerals trade in bulk and 
are therefore potentially easier to document and regulate (Prendergast & Lezhnev, 2009). In 
addition, the structure of the 3T minerals market is different from that of gold (Pact, 2013). 
Geographically, the area of study is the African Great Lakes Region, which includes the DRC and 
the adjoining countries (Figure 3.1. The centre of investigation, however, is the DRC (Figure 3.2. 
where there is illicit 3T minerals exploitation and trade that finances armed conflict. The scope of 
this research covers only the upstream supply chain; that is, from mine site to smelter. This is the 
stage in the global supply chain where mineral ores are potentially traceable before smelting, 
whence they are converted into metals and often mixed and made into different less-traceable 
forms.  
 
Figure 3.1. The Great Lakes Region. Source: Global Indigo (n.d.).  
Member States include DRC, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Zambia, 
Tanzania, Central African Republic, and Sudan & South Sudan. They are all categorized in level 
3 countries. 
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Figure 3.2. The map of the DRC.  
Surface: 2.345.000Km2. Population: 78 million. Source: hmoechkel (2015). The red circle shows 
the Eastern DRC where the 3T minerals are mined. 
3.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Collection of data via semi-structured interview requires the researcher to employ a set of 
predetermined, yet open-ended, questions on topics to be covered (Bryman & Bell, 2015; DiCicco-
Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Bryman and Bell (2015) consider semi-structured questions to serve as 
a guide that leads the interviewer into a free conversation with the interviewee. The semi-structured 
interview was selected for this study to secure primary and quality data from practitioners. 
Interviews were valuable for three reasons. First, interviews provided information that 
documentary sources could not display. Second, interviews gave access to different perspectives 
on the issue under investigation. The researcher was, for example, able to glean information from 
top management staff, such as auditors, smelters, exporters and miners, who understand the 
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practice of traceability implementation in the conflict minerals supply chain. Third, interviews 
allowed the researcher to access different organizations closer to the physical supply chain, 
including auditors who do not, as a rule, provide publication of their work. 
This study used purposive sampling, which is described as a “deliberate choice of an informant 
due to the qualities the informant possesses” (Tongco, 2007, p. 147). In purposive sampling, the 
sample is not intended to be statistically representative, thus certain topic-focused criteria are used 
as basis of selection (Patton, 2002; Ritchie et al., 2013; Singleton & Straits, 2005). Selection of 
informants was based on three criteria: 1) accessibility to informants and their willingness to 
provide information; and 2) ability of informants to demonstrate relevant experience in 3T 
minerals traceability 3) qualitative representativeness of participants involved in 3T traceability 
activities.  
For informant recruitment purposes, sixteen requests were sent out. However, only ten informants 
responded and all were recruited. Among the ten informants were two in-chain and eight out-of-
chain informants (Table 3.2). In the context of this study, in-chain informants are 3T minerals 
supply chain actors that actually make physical contact with 3T minerals. These include miners, 
traders, exporters, and smelters. Out-of-chain informants refer to actors that are not directly 
handling 3T minerals, but rather that provide support or play administrative roles in traceability 
around the physical supply chain. These include the traceability provider, service providers, and 
organizations involved in the implementation of the traceability system. 
Regarding the in-chain category, only two informants could be recruited. However, the miner 
interviewed plays a triple role in the chain as miner, trader and exporter. Likewise, the smelter 
interviewed acts also as a trader and exporter. One of the interviewed organizations provided two 
informants. Two auditors were interviewed.  
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Table 3.2. Sampling of informants.  
Two types of informants are sampled: in-chain informants and out-of-chain informants. 
 
Type of 
Informant 
In-chain Informants Out-of-Chain Informants 
      NGOs            Gov. Agencies       Serv. Providers 
Interviewed 
Informant 
Miner Trader Exporter Smelter Enough 
Project 
PAC6 BGR7 ICGLR8 Pact Auditor 
Number  1   1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
 
Given that the sampled informants to be interviewed were not local to the researcher, face-to-face 
interviews were impractical. Thus, telephone and Skype interviews with companies’ managers, 
programs’ directors and auditors were used. Each interview was planned to ideally last 30 minutes. 
This is consistent with the recommendation of Frey (2004), who suggested that a telephone 
interview should be kept within the time-frame of 20 to 25 minutes. However, the researcher must 
be flexible to get the most out of interviewees in a qualitative GT study, and acknowledging this 
fact, many went longer than planned. 
Interviews were conducted during the months of February, March, April and May 2016.  Based on 
the objectives of the research, interviews focused on exploring drivers and challenges to 
traceability in conflict minerals supply chain. 
Before launching the primary data collection, an interview guide consisting of ten questions was 
prepared and pre-tested on an auditor.  Results of the pre-test interview led to the refinement of 
questions and the focus on two main open-ended questions (Appendix A). From the outset, the 
interviewer made clear the nature of the data sought: that is, to understand the factors impacting 
the current traceability practice in conflict minerals supply chain. 
  
                                                     
6 PAC: Partnership Africa-Canada 
7 BGR: Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources) 
8 ICGLR: International Conference of the Great Lakes Region 
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The interview guide was divided into two main areas of inquiry:  
1) Drivers that motivate participation in traceability of conflict minerals; 
2) Barriers that impede traceability in conflict minerals supply chain.  
Interviews were recorded using a voice recorder device. Interviews ranged from twenty-five to 
forty-five minutes. Transcription of recorded interviews was a painstaking and time consuming 
exercise. Recorded interviews were manually transcribed to text form for content analysis; and 
written transcripts ranged from 1309 to 4448 words. An average of six hours was needed to 
transcribe a thirty-five minute interview. After transcription, each transcript was edited. 
3.3.2 Analysis Techniques  
Inductive content analysis was performed to analyze interviews data. After superficially reading 
and re-reading the transcripts, a closer reading was conducted to identify relevant text segments 
related to the objectives of the study. Each informant interviewed was assigned a code starting 
with the letter I. For example, informant 1 received the code I01. Corbin and Strauss define content 
analysis as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents - both printed and 
electronic (i.e., computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
p.27). Thus, data from interviews were inductively analyzed via a coding process to develop 
relevant codes. Through inductive analysis fueled by a close reading of raw data as described by 
theorists (Patton, 1980; Thomas, 2006), useful codes and categories related to drivers and barriers 
were derived (Table 3.3.). Definitions of categories are provided in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.3. Coding of drivers and barriers mentioned by interviewed informants.  
“N” refers to the number of informants responses. Questions allowed for multiple responses. 
 
Drivers for Participation in 3T Minerals Traceability 
Categories Codes Description 
External driver  Legal requirement 
N=7 
 Social pressure 
N=3 
 Dodd-Frank Act 1502 on 
conflict minerals 
 NGOs pressure  
 Consumer demand 
 Civil society pressure 
Internal driver  Market access 
N=8 
 Ability to sell material 
 Ability to overcome export 
requirement 
                                                  Barriers to 3T minerals Traceability 
Institutional barrier  Lack of capacity and resources 
N=9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lack of Transparency 
N=5 
 
 Monopoly 
N=4 
 
 Technology 
N=4 
 
 Cost 
N=3 
 Deficient monitoring of mines, 
trade routes & trading points 
 Lack of equipment (database) 
 Poor wages 
 Supply chain structure with 
unnecessary intermediaries who 
bring undocumented material 
into the supply chain 
 
 Lack of information/data 
sharing within the chain 
 
 Traceability service provided 
by a single provider (iTSCi) 
 
 Errors and illegible information  
 Data collection & transmission 
hurdles 
 Onerous & time intensive 
 Decline in funding vs. increase 
in services to provide 
Contextual barrier  Infrastructure & logistics 
N=3 
 
 Weak/Lack of law enforcement 
N=2 
 Insecurity  
N=2 
 Remoteness of mine sites 
 Poor roads 
 Limited access to technology 
 Buyers of untagged material not 
prosecuted 
 Presence of armed groups 
People-driven 
barrier 
 Misrepresentation of origin 
N=2 
 Corruption 
N=4 
 Mixing of material from 
unknown sources 
 Tag sold by tracking agents  
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Table 3.4. Definition of categories 
Category Definition 
External drivers Refers to motivations from outside the system/firm which compel 
supply chain actors to comply with a set of predefined requirements. 
Internal drivers Refers to motivations that arise from within the system/firm to 
address specific needs and objectives of the system/firm. 
Institutional barriers Pertains to the hindrances resulting from actions or inaction, 
policies and practices of the DRC government and iTSCi. 
Contextual barriers Refers to obstacles pertaining to circumstances/reality on the 
ground.  
People-driven barriers Refers to impediments caused by the behavior or deliberate actions 
of humans (i.e., supply chain actors and tracking agents). 
 
Creswell (2002) and Bryman et al. (2009) suggest that developing categories involves breaking 
down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data. Selected data were broken 
down analytically into units of meaning. Transcripts were coded by hand. The manual coding, 
although time intensive, was beneficial as it allowed for deep engagement with data, and 
concurrently, assisted the assigning of codes into categories. Three coding methods were 
employed: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. 
Open coding, the analytical process of assigning labels/codes to units of texts, was used first 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990). In the coding process, in vivo codes, that is, informants’ actual words, 
were used to describe the data. After the initial coding, units having the same meaning were color 
coded. Some samples of open coding are provided in Appendix B and Appendix D. 
Next, axial coding was employed as a process of bringing together data that were fragmented and 
labeled during open/initial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). All units having the same color 
coding were then collated for further analysis. Samples of axial coding can be found in Appendix 
C and Appendix E. 
Finally, selective coding was used to integrate and refine codes (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). As 
result, overlap and redundancy among codes were reduced to derive significant categories, as 
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suggested by Creswell (2002). A sample of selective coding is provided in Appendix F. Verbatim 
quotations were extracted to be integrated into the text as evidence and explanation to findings 
(Appendix G). 
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: Results 
This chapter presents the results from the ten interviews conducted to answer the research 
objectives of the study. The purpose of this study is to understand the factors impacting traceability 
of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in the DRC in particular, and identify 
potential opportunities for improvement. To achieve this purpose, the study aims to identify and 
examine the drivers that motivate participation in traceability system of conflict minerals; identify 
and explain the barriers that inhibit traceability of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa, and in the DRC in particular. The results are presented as follows. First, section 4.1 presents 
the results pertaining to the drivers that motivate implementation and participation in traceability 
in 3T minerals supply chain. Second, section 4.2 provides results related to barriers inhibiting 
successful traceability in 3T minerals supply chain.  
4.1 Identified Drivers for Participation in Traceability of 3T Minerals  
The first question asked to the interviewees was to identify the drivers that motivate participation 
in traceability of 3T minerals. As shown in Figure 4.1., three major drivers for participation in 
traceability in 3T mineral supply chain were identified; among the identified drivers, market access 
ranks highest, followed by legal requirement. Social pressure is ranked lowest. Identified drivers 
were classified into two categories: internal and external drivers. 
4.1.1 Internal Driver 
This type of driver arises from the need and objective of the supply chain actor/firm. One 
internal driver was identified.  
4.1.1.1 Market Access 
Eight out ten informants said that market access is the major driver that motivates participation in 
traceability of 3T minerals in the Great Lakes Region, in the DRC in particular. For instance, I01 
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asserted that: “Without any type of traceability, we will be in a position where we won’t be able to 
export our minerals. Therefore full traceability was required, from the mine to the upgrading plant, 
including transport”. This statement was seconded by I10 who noted that: “From the in-region 
supply chain actors’ perspective, participation in traceability helps us sell and export our 
minerals, and trade them in the international market”. However, it was made clear by informants 
that the drive for market access was stimulated by the market requirement, from buyers, especially 
US publicly traded firms, to trade in traceable material. 
 
Figure 4.1. Drivers for implementation and participation in traceability of 3T minerals.  
In this regard, I02 said:  
The main driver that changed everything is the market requirement. The market 
requirement in turn was driven by the law (DFA). The negociants were compelled to do 
what the comptoirs exporters wanted, and the exporters were constrained to do what the 
smelter wanted. The smelters as well were obliged to do what downstream requires.  
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As example, I02 added: “When we started to implement traceability system, I went into the mines 
with a negociant. He stood up in front of the mine and said: Guys you see this tags, I am not buying 
your minerals unless you have these tags in your bag”. 
In conclusion, market access stood out as the main driver referenced by interviewees. Market 
accessibility is essential for upstream supply chain actors in the region needing to sell and export 
their material. The excerpts show how actors engage in traceability to meet economic interests. 
4.1.2 External drivers 
External drivers arise from outside the supply chain and compel supply chain actors to meet certain 
requirements. Two external drivers were identified: legal requirement (DFA) and social pressure. 
4.1.2.1 Legal Requirement 
As displayed in Figure 4.1., seven informants identified legal requirement (specifically the US 
regulation resulting from the DFA) as the driver that motivated the implementation of traceability 
in 3T minerals supply chain from mine to OEMs. In this regard, I09 stated:  
The law is the driver of traceability implementation in 3T supply chain. I do not believe 
that if DFA would not have passed in 2010 people would be looking at traceability the way 
they are doing now. There is therefore a legal requirement for publicly traded companies 
to exercise due diligence on the origin of minerals they use in the products they 
manufacture.   
This statement was supported by another informant who underscored that: “It is the Dodd-Frank 
Act 1502 that was signed into law in 2010 by the US government that motivated the implementation 
of traceability. Industry was required by the DFA to report that their business has nothing to do 
with the conflict in the region” (I07). It was also observed that although regulation (DFA) is not 
the direct driver for participation in traceability, it had an impact on the 3T minerals supply chain. 
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As evidence, I02 indicated that: “The Dodd-Frank Act 1502 pressure led US consumer companies 
to use market influence to change the behavior of suppliers”. From this perspective, it can be seen 
that regulation did not only impact publicly traded companies, but the entire supply chain, even if 
indirectly.  
4.1.2.2 Social Pressure 
As delineated in Figure 4.1., three informants identified social pressure as a factor driving 
traceability participation. Social pressure can be broken down into three pressure groups (Table 
4.1.). 
Table 4.1. Pressure groups for responsible sourcing of conflict minerals. 
Code            Description 
Social Pressure  NGOs pressure 
 Consumer demand 
 Civil society pressure 
 
Social pressure is seen as a factor that impacted traceability implementation in conflict minerals 
supply chain. According to I02: “Sometimes civil society pressure and consumers’ demands have 
an impact, but they do not really change things in the same way that the law does”. Moreover, 
some other interviewees, such as I07 noted that: “NGOs pressure was influential in the 
development of the US regulation on conflict minerals, which led US publicly traded companies 
to require traceability of minerals to their suppliers up to the mine”. From these statements, can 
be seen that social pressure, in the context of conflict minerals, played a double role. It pressured 
the industry for responsible practices, but it also influenced the development of regulation (DFA). 
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The results in this section showed that participation in traceability of 3T minerals is driven by 
market access, legal requirement, and social pressure. However, the key driver that triggers 
participation is market access.  
4.2 Identified Barriers to Traceability in 3T Minerals Supply Chain 
The second question asked to the interviewees was to identify barriers to participation in 
traceability of 3T minerals. Barriers to traceability are classified into three categories (Figure 4.2.). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Barriers to traceability of 3T minerals.  
Barriers are classified into three categories: Institutional barriers in blue, contextual barriers in 
green, and people-driven in red. 
4.2.1 Institutional barriers 
Institutional barriers refer to hindrances resulting from action, inaction, policies and practices of 
institutions involved in the implementation of 3T minerals traceability. Institutions involved in 3T 
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minerals traceability are the DRC government and iTSCi. Institutional barriers to 3T minerals 
traceability are displayed in Figure 4.2.; the DRC lack of capacity and resources is the highest, 
followed by iTSCi lack of transparency, iTSCi monopoly, and technology. Cost is the least 
commonly referenced barrier. 
4.2.1.1 Lack of capacity and resources  
Nine out of the ten interviewed informants identified lack of capacity and resources in the DRC as 
a major barrier impeding efficient implementation of 3T minerals traceability across the supply 
chain. Responses associated with the DRC lack of capacity and resources as barrier are 
summarized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Institutional barriers to traceability of 3T minerals 
 
Barrier             Description 
DRC government lack of 
capacity and resources 
 Deficient monitoring of mines, trade routes, and 
trading points. 
 Lack of necessary equipment (database). 
 Low wage and lack of incentive for tracking agents. 
 Supply chain structure with unnecessary 
intermediaries  
Lack of transparency (iTSCi)  Limited/lack of information sharing. 
Monopoly  Traceability service provided by a single provider, 
iTSCi. 
Technology  Errors and illegible information. 
 Data collection & transmission hurdles. 
 Onerous and time intensive. 
Cost  Implementation expensive and onerous. 
 Decline in funding vs. increasing expenditure.  
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According to interviewed informants, the DRC lacks capacity to effectively monitor trade routes 
and trading points, to enforce the law over artisanal mining and trade, to prevent and prosecute 
fraud within the chain, and to control services involved in traceability. For example, I04 noted: “It 
is known that at the negociant level, the negociants are bringing in materials from other mine sites 
that have not been qualified. They mix this stuff with verified mines. However, nothing has been 
envisaged by the DRC government to prevent that to happen”. This statement was further 
supported by another informant who said: “What we are seeing that hurts the process of 
traceability is that once the minerals leave the mine site, there are no monitors along the trading 
route where is a lot of trafficking and mixing of conflict minerals with conflict-free minerals 
occurs” (I08).  
Moreover, informants indicated that the DRC lack of resources is a hindrance to traceability of 3T 
minerals. Two reasons were evoked: 1) Government services lack adequate equipment such as a 
database, which allows for traceability data verification and monitoring and 2) tracking agents not 
being paid/incentivized to carry out their job with integrity. To substantiate these facts, I03 pointed 
out that: “ITSCi is continuously improving as to how to manage the system. The challenge for the 
DRC is the lack of capacity and resources to efficiently manage minerals traceability data. In 
other words, the DRC has a big problem for data management in that it has no database at all”. 
Likewise, I02 added that: “There is a growing concern with government agents who are not 
necessarily being paid on time, or not being paid at all. This factor is very demotivating for them”. 
Along the same lines, I01 corroborated: “In my experience, I know that a lot of mines do not have 
regular government agents on sites. They may show up once a week to tag the material. So, it 
appears that tagged materials come from that mine, but in reality they may have come from 
anywhere”. In addition, some informants noted that the involvement of numerous unnecessary 
intermediaries poses an important threat to ensuring traceability of 3T minerals. Regarding 
intermediaries, one interviewee stated: “The status of verified mine sites is made public. 
Intermediary traders are supposed to buy minerals from verified mines. However, many 
intermediaries do not. They buy minerals from any sources, verified or not. This factor present a 
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barrier to traceability of minerals” (I06). This suggests that intermediaries play a pivotal role in 
the mixing of minerals before smelting, which makes it difficult to identify the origin of material. 
4.2.1.2 Lack of transparency  
Five out of the ten informants identified lack of transparency as a weighty challenge to traceability 
of 3T minerals (Figure 4.2.). This lack of transparency is attributed to iTSCi, which controls and 
manages traceability information. According to informants, iTSCi does not share data/information 
on mineral flows nor on incidents as expected. As evidenced in one informant’s testimony:  
It is only now we have come to realize that information sharing is key to ensuring 
traceability of origin of 3Ts. The first time this process was being set up, neither the 
secretariat nor the member states had a very good understanding of the requirements on 
information sharing. Now given the experience there is a need to review the working 
relationship with ITRI. Member states have now realized that they were not keen when they 
were discussing with ITRI, particularly on the data sharing (I07).  
This statement was supported by another informant who underscored that: “The current 
traceability scheme is a complete black box; iTSCi has in fact provided no transparent information 
whatsoever in terms of where the minerals come from, how they are supplied, where they go.” 
(I04). These statements suggest that the attributes of 3T minerals exploited and traded via iTSCi 
scheme are not cross-checked by supply chain actors nor by the DRC government.  
4.2.1.3 Monopoly 
As displayed in Figure 4.2., four out of the ten informants felt that having a single scheme that 
provides traceability services and alone controls minerals from the Great Lakes Region, which 
mostly are channeled to ITRI association’s members, presents a barrier to traceability. Regarding 
this, I01 commented:  
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Lack of competition is a significant challenge to 3T minerals supply chain transparency 
and traceability. If iTSCi had competitors of any type, we would look at all irregularities 
going on in the system and say, hold on a second, you are not doing your job properly, I 
am going to move to someone else. But because iTSCi has no competitor, you take it or 
leave it. Yet, right now the fact is, without them we can’t sell our minerals.  
In addition, other informants felt that a single traceability scheme is not enough to efficiently 
provide a competitive service in the whole region. For, example, I03 observed: “People are 
complaining that smuggling, tag trafficking, corruption is still going on. Ideally one single scheme 
cannot do the job because of the wide scale of artisanal and small scale mining in the region. It is 
too big and too difficult to handle”. This statement was supported by another informant who 
reported the following:  
In my experience, one traceability scheme in the whole region is not ideal for two reasons. 
First, there are a lot of the mine sites out there. Second, there is an obligation to conduct 
due diligence in all mine sites. In the region you have more than eight hundred mine sites. 
Tell me, how do you manage to do due diligence, and track efficiently minerals from all 
these sites. You can’t. As consequence, a lot of mine sites do not have tracking agents on 
site on a regular basis (I01).  
Conversely, from interviews it was found that some informants considered that the traceability 
monopoly as currently practiced in the region does not pose any threats to transparency and 
traceability. The following statement demonstrates this: “As for me, I do not see very much iTSCi 
monopoly as a challenge to traceability of minerals.  I do not know how much potential materials 
there is in the region that could be flowing out of the region that would necessitate the intervention 
of other schemes” (I09). 
The excerpts provided in this section illustrate the presence of conflicting opinions about the iTSCi 
monopoly in the region. However, two impacts of iTSCi monopoly are observed: lack of 
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competitive delivery and restriction of 3T minerals market to ITRI members. From interviews, can 
be seen the limitation of having a single traceability provider in the region, and the need for 
competition to ensure competitive delivery. 
4.2.1.4 Technology 
Technology, in this context, refers to the tool used for traceability data recording and transfer. As 
shown in Figure 4.2., four of the ten interviewed informants indicated that the manual paper-based 
process currently employed to identify materials, document the chain of custody, and transfer 
minerals data/information is in many ways inefficient and subpar. In this regard, one informant 
involved in the physical supply chain reported that: “Paper-based system is time consuming. Log 
sheets take time to arrive at the head quarter where they are then verified, scanned and sent to the 
iTSCi database in the UK” (I02). This statement was supported by another informant who stated: 
“The use manual process for data recording represents a challenge. Sometimes, since it is a 
manual process there are gaps in those processes. I have seen where there is documentation 
missing. And, it takes a little while to capture it” (I09). These two statements were corroborated 
by I08: “Obviously, with the paper-based system currently used, the logbook can be tampered; the 
agent/government official can change data easily if he wanted to, and no one will ever know. It 
makes it as well very difficult to search and see different records”. From these excerpts, it can be 
seen that the technology currently used for 3T minerals traceability is time intensive, prone to error 
and delays, and vulnerable to falsification. However, it has yet to be determined whether manual 
technology is the best recording system to ensure transparency on the origin of mineral and 
efficiency. 
4.2.1.5 Cost 
Three informants of out the ten interviewees considered implementing 3T minerals traceability 
system as cost intensive (Figure 4.2.). Interviewed informants observed a decline in funding, while 
the accruing expenditure on traceability implementation tends to rise due to the increasing number 
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of qualified mine sites. The cost barrier was acknowledged by both supply chain actors and 
traceability providers. I01, for example, stated that: “One of the biggest challenges is related to 
the price of minerals. The level of mineral production has reduced due to the price that is currently 
very depressed. On the other hand, the overall financial cost of running the program does not 
reduce, but the available funding to keep it going has reduced”. 
This statement was supported by another informant who stated that: “Cost related to running 3T 
minerals traceability system is a real challenge. The system has increasing services to be catered, 
and employs a lot of personnel that need to be paid” (I07). From both statements, it can be inferred 
that the disproportion between funding available and the sizeable volume of material to be traced 
is likely to compromise the quality of traceability service to be provided.  
4.2.2 Contextual Barriers 
Contextual barriers pertain to challenges relating to the physical reality in the DRC. Interviewed 
informants indicated that traceability of 3T minerals is implemented in a challenging context. 
Three specific contextual barriers were identified (Figure 4.2.).  
4.2.2.1 Infrastructure and logistics 
Three of the ten informants identified infrastructure and logistics as a major issue that 
compromises efficient implementation of traceability of 3T minerals in the Eastern DRC (Figure 
4.2.). As outlined in Table 3.3., infrastructure and logistics barriers were defined in terms of 
remoteness of mine sites, lack of/limited access to technology and poor roads. With regard to the 
remoteness of mine sites and poor roads, one informant disclosed that: “The large territory to 
cover and long distances to travel represent a real challenge to traceability” (I10). This statement 
was seconded by another informant who noted that: “Remoteness of mine sites and inaccessibility 
of most roads makes it difficult to collect log book sheets” (I02). Statements from both informants 
suggest the existence of physical hurdles for tracking 3T minerals from all qualified mines in the 
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Great Lakes Region, and in the DRC in particular. Further, other informants pointed out that 
limited/lack of access to needed technology fosters an environment in which electronic data 
collection and transfer is a significant barrier. In this regard, one interviewed informant commented 
that: “The ideal is to have computer-based traceability system operate everywhere. However for 
some of the remote mines where there is no electricity, no network, and there is no way of doing 
maintenance for the handsets” (I02).  
4.2.2.2 Lack of law enforcement 
The absence of law enforcement was considered a significant barrier in that offenders who break 
the law on minerals trade and traceability are not prosecuted accordingly. Two out of the ten 
interviewed informants felt that if there were some sort of law enforcement, there would be less 
corruption and trade in material from unknown sources (Table 3.3.). This indicates that traceability 
of 3T minerals is implemented in the context of lawlessness.  One informant working on the ground 
explained that: “The DRC adopted the OECD requirements as law. So since is the law, in fact, it 
is illegal for untagged minerals to be sold within and outside the DRC. However, we have not seen 
sanctions taken against those trading in untagged material” (I02). This indicates the legal context 
in which traceability of 3T minerals is implemented. It can be therefore stated that the 
implementation of traceability in 3T minerals in the DRC takes place in the context of lawlessness, 
which inhibits efficient traceability. This barrier is specific to the 3T minerals traceability. 
4.2.2.3 Lack of security 
As portrayed in Figure 4.2., two informants out of ten mentioned lack of security as a factor that 
inhibits the implementation of traceability of 3T minerals. According to interviewed informants, 
the presence of armed groups prevented access to mine sites, whose production is easily infiltrated 
in the legal supply chain. I02, for instance, stated: “We have covered most of the easily accessible 
areas. There are still areas where we would like to work, but we were not able to. This is partly 
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down to security. Some areas still have a lot of insecurity which is challenging to traceability 
because it means we can’t get to those sites”.  
To summarize, the evidence provided by interviewed informants show that traceability of 3T 
minerals faces several contextual barriers related to reality in the Eastern DRC, where long 
distances, poor roads, unreliable power supply and the presence of armed groups constitute 
significant factors that hamper traceability.   
4.2.3 People-driven barriers 
People-driven barriers refer to challenges resulting from actions of supply chain actors and 
tracking agents involved in traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC. Two specific people-driven 
barriers were identified (Figure 4.2.).  
4.2.3.1 Misrepresentation of Origin  
Figure 4.2. shows that two out of the ten interviewed informants viewed the mixing and tagging 
of material from unknown origin with those from qualified mine sites as a factor that obstructs the 
identification of relevant attributes of 3T minerals. Interview results indicate that the effectiveness 
of traceability of 3T minerals is undermined by the mixing of material from unknown sources at 
the negociant stage. As evidence, I05 stated: “The trader level is the weakest point of the 3T 
minerals supply chain. There is an observable chaos at this point of the chain. Oftentimes traders 
purchase and process undocumented materials. As result, information on the mine of origin gets 
lost”. Moreover, other informants noted that misrepresentation of origin is also partly due the 
structure of the supply chain, which is loaded with intermediaries, through whom unwanted 
minerals are infiltrated into the chain.   
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4.2.3.2 Corruption 
As shown in Figure 4.2., four of the ten interviewed informants considered the corruption/bribery 
in the upstream supply chain to be a factor negatively impacting 3T minerals traceability. Interview 
results suggest that corruption, which involves traders and tracking agents takes place at trading 
points where materials are to be tagged, mixed and processed. An informant involved in the 
physical supply chain indicated that “Another challenge to 3T minerals traceability is that tag is 
a sellable commodity” (I01). To underscore the negative impact of the ongoing corruption in 3T 
minerals traceability, I02 went on to explain: “Materials being smuggled into Rwanda, where they 
enter the system, are readily tagged in the Congo”. This shows that corruption and mixing of 
material, which involves traders, intermediaries and tracking agents poses a challenge to 
traceability on 3T minerals.  
To summarize, results of this section revealed that ten barriers impede traceability in 3T minerals 
supply chain. These include: 1) the DRC lack of capacity and resources, 2) lack of transparency, 
3) monopoly, 4) technology, 5) cost, 6) infrastructure and logistics, 7) lack of law enforcement, 8) 
insecurity, 9) misrepresentation of origin and 10) corruption.  
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: Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to understand the factors impacting traceability of conflict minerals in 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in the DRC in particular, and identify potential opportunities 
for improvement. This study provides a broader understanding of the opportunities, drivers and 
barriers to the implementation and participation in traceability in product supply chains. By 
focusing on conflict minerals, the study illustrates how factors impacting traceability 
implementation and participation can converge and diverge from what is commonly identified in 
the traceability literature where previous analysis is on agricultural, fish and forest products. The 
previous chapter presented results from interviews. This chapter discusses key findings of the 
study in line with literature reviewed and explains the factors impacting the implementation of 
traceability in 3T minerals. Section 5.1 will address the first objective of the study, that is, to 
identify and examine the drivers that motivate participation in traceability of conflict minerals. 
Section 5.2 will examine the second objective, that is, to identify and explain the barriers that 
inhibit traceability of 3T minerals in the Great Lakes Region, and in the DRC in particular. Section 
5.3 will discuss opportunities for improvement. Section 5.4 will provide the study’s contribution 
to the literature. Section 5.5 will provide the study’s findings application to industry. Section 5.6 
will present the limitations of the study. Section 5.7 will provide direction for future research. 
5.1 Drivers for Participation in Traceability of 3T Minerals 
The first objective of the study is to identify drivers that motivate participation in traceability of 
3T minerals. This section examines how identified drivers are intertwined and explains the reason 
behind the leading drivers. Ten interviewed informants were asked to indicate the drivers that 
trigger participation in traceability of 3T minerals. As presented in section 4.1 of the results 
chapter, three drivers for participation in traceability were identified: legal requirement, market 
access and social pressure. These results are supported by the extant literature (Aung & Chang, 
2013; Preziosi, 2014). A literature suggests that legal requirement is the key driver for participation 
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in traceability (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Golan et al., 2004; Mattevi & Jones, 2015, Preziosi 
et al., 2014). However, the findings of this study show that market access is the key driver for 
participation in 3T minerals traceability. As shown Figure 5.1, market requirement/pressure from 
US firms arose the need of suppliers to secure market access via participation in traceability. 
Informants clearly indicated that supply chain actors participate in traceability for market access 
purposes. This finding echoes the results of Xue, Wewei, Zettan, Peng and Weiguang (2007), who 
determined that market is the key driver for vegetable traceability in China. This finding is also 
supported by the finding in the study of Na (2016) on social responsibility of firms in conflict 
minerals supply chains that ensuring access to market is key to smelters and refiners compliance. 
In addition, this finding is also in line with the results of Mattevi and Jones (2015) that market 
access is an internal driver that motivates participation in traceability. For 3T minerals supply 
chain actors, accessing the market via traceability is seen in terms of economic interest in that only 
tagged material can be legally sold and exported. Moreover, although market access emerged as 
the key driver, the results suggest that there is a domino effect between social pressure, legal 
requirements in the USA and market access (Figure 5.1.). 
This means that to a certain extent it is a combination of social pressure, the US law and market 
forces that led to the implementation of traceability at large, and to participation in traceability. 
Although it is believed that social pressure on industry was insignificant as an influence to improve 
their sourcing behavior, it played a remarkable role in the process of the DFA enactment into law.  
Moreover, given the concerns related to conflict minerals exploitation and trade (Enough Project, 
2014; Prendergast & Lehznev, 2009; Hates & Burge, 2003), which are addressed via 
implementation of traceability, it is unexpected to see market access emerge as the key driver for 
participation in 3T minerals traceability. This suggests a gap in the motivations driving traceability 
in conflict minerals. It is therefore surprising to observe that none of the informants considered 
sustainability or removal of conflict-related material from the supply chain as motivations driving 
participation in traceability. 
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Figure 5.1. Interconnection of identified drivers for traceability of 3T minerals.  
(*) OEMs refers to original equipment manufacturers. In this context, they are US publicly traded 
companies affected by the Dodd-Frank legislation on conflict minerals. Miners, traders and exporters are 
located in the DRC. Smelters and refiners are located in Asia (e.g., China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan), 
in Europe (e.g., Germany, Sweden, and Austria), in America (e.g., USA, Bolivia, and Peru). The downward 
arrow indicates the market influence from down the US firms impacted by the DFA section 1502 to their 
suppliers to the miners. The upward arrow shows the suppliers, especially upstream actors’ 
response/participation driven by the need to access the market. 
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5.2 Barriers to Traceability of 3T Minerals 
The second objective of this study is to identify and explain the barriers that inhibit traceability of 
3Tt minerals in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and in the DRC in particular. In this section, the 
findings pertaining to barriers to traceability are discussed in connection to their underlying causes. 
5.2.1 Institutional barriers to traceability 
The notion of an institutional barrier resulting from policies, laws, action or inaction of a given 
institution is present in the literature (Jantarasami et al., 2010; Powell et al., 2009; Robinson, 2006; 
Watkins et al., 2012). In the case of traceability of 3T minerals, institutional barriers are linked to 
institutions involved in the implementation of traceability. One particular aspect of traceability in 
3T minerals in the DRC is that the DRC government and iTSCi have the sole responsibility for the 
implementation of traceability. As outlined in Table 4.2., the results show that lack of capacity and 
resources of the DRC government, lack of transparency on traceability data, monopoly, technology 
and cost are seen as institutional barriers to traceability of 3T minerals.  
Numerous researchers have identified cost, technology and lack of transparency as barriers to 
traceability in food, agricultural and fish/seafood products (Alfaro & Rabade, 2009; Aung & 
Chang, 2014; Bechini et al., 2005; Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Golan et al., 2005/2014; Mattevi 
& Jones, 2015; Regattieri et al., 2007; Senneset et al., 2007; Story et al., 2013; Van der Vorst, 
2009). In the context of traceability of conflict minerals in the DRC, a report by Pact (2015) 
suggested that providing traceability services to all qualified mine sites, trade routes, and trading 
points is cost intensive. The findings of the present study illuminate how the rising costs relative 
to the increasing traceability services compared against the decrease in funding poses a significant 
challenge to traceability. As for technology, the results of this study align with Pact (2015) in 
asserting that the paper-based system poses barriers to traceability, such as the difficulty 
transmitting data from remote mine sites, recording errors and illegible information. This finding 
also compares as well with the conclusion of Syahruddin and Kalchschmidt (2011) that technology 
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poses a barrier to the traceability of cocoa in Indonesia as cocoa collectors lack adequate 
data/information recording and transfer systems.  
Previous studies found that lack of transparency presents a barrier to traceability in food, 
agricultural and fish/seafood product supply chains (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; Donnelly & 
Karlsen, 2010; Donnelly & Olsen, 2012; Regattieri et al., 2007; Storoy et al., 2013; Thompson et 
al., 2005; Van der Vorst, 2004). Interviewed informants also indicated that transparency is 
deficient in 3T minerals traceability due to lack of/deficient traceability data/information 
sharing/exchange. This finding supports the results of Projekt-Consult GmbH (2013) showing that 
iTSCi does not provide access to the centralized database, while it would be beneficial to compare 
traceability data for transparency purposes. Traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC would benefit 
from a transparent system, which considers both sharing of relevant information with eligible 
stakeholders on one account, and engaging them through feedbacks on the other. Given the 
importance of transparency in traceability of products, it can be said that transparency presents an 
opportunity for improvement.  
The literature in traceability of product supply chains identifies the lack of capacity as a barrier to 
traceability, including lack of adequate equipment and trained staff (Bosona & Gebresenbet, 2013; 
Mattevi & Jones, 2015). The present study shows that the DRC government lacks capacity and 
resources that manifests in ill-equipped tracking agents, a weak monitoring system, lack of a 
database, a lack of incentive for staff, a lack of funds to ensure mine sites qualification, a lack of 
control over traceability activities, and weak policy on intermediaries. The DRC’s lack of capacity 
and resources as a barrier to traceability has been also observed by Pact (n.d). The lack of resources 
and adequate equipment (i.e., database) boils down to capacity imbalance between the DRC 
government and iTSCi, which prevents the DRC government from exercising oversight and 
comparing traceability data with iTSCi’s. Based on results, it can be stated that the DRC’s lack of 
capacity and resources is an opportunity for improvement.  
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The notion of traceability system monopoly is absent in the literature and is thus a novel insight 
provided by the present study. The results show that minerals are traded under a single scheme 
that is controlled by an interest group representing 70-80% of worldwide smelters (ITRI smelters 
association). From the results, it can be seen that the informants indicated that the iTSCi monopoly 
is an opportunity for improvement. This means that opening traceability of 3T minerals to other 
providers has the potential to ensure higher transparency on the origin of minerals and competitive 
delivery.  
5.2.2 Contextual Barriers to Traceability of 3T minerals 
The significance of identifying contextual barriers for framing policies is acknowledged in 
sustainability literature (Azhoni et al., 2016). Contextual barriers identified in this study are 
defined in terms of challenges or limitations emerging from within the DRC-specific environment, 
which inhibit traceability. The present study concludes that identified contextual barriers (i.e., poor 
infrastructure and logistics, insecurity, and lack of/deficient law enforcement) negatively impact 
traceability of 3T minerals. Interviewed informants indicated, for example, that mine sites are 
difficult to reach, logbook sheets are hard to collect due to poor roads, long distances to travel, and 
the presence of armed groups. This finding aligns with Pact’s (2015) report that some of the 
greatest barriers to 3T minerals traceability include infrastructure, access, conflict and security.  
Additionally, one informant stated that the lack of electric power prevented them from using 
advanced technology, which would improve traceability outcomes. Another informant commented 
that in the DRC, people involved in smuggling, corruption and mixing of material from unknown 
sources are not prosecuted. The point that was being made by informants is that traceability of 3T 
minerals is not effective as it should be, partly due to lawlessness in the DRC, which is not 
conducive to efficient traceability. 
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5.2.3 People-Driven Barriers to Traceability of 3T minerals 
This study demonstrates that barriers to traceability of 3T minerals are not only institutional or 
contextual, but they are also attributed to people involved in the trade at each step of the upstream 
supply chain. The study findings show that misrepresentation of origin, which involves mixing of 
material from unknown sources, and corruption, which involves trafficking of tags, are people-
related barriers that inhibit traceability of 3T minerals. Previous studies in food, agricultural and 
fish/seafood product supply chains have identified the mixing of raw materials at the early stages 
of the supply chain as a barrier to traceability (Armani et al., 2015; Bollen et al., 2007; Donnelly 
& Karlsen, 2010). In the context of 3T minerals traceability, informants underscored that 
government agents in charge of tags receive monetary compensation from traders in exchange for 
tags, which are affixed on unidentified materials supplied by intermediaries.  
Sustainability literature from the agri-food supply chain context identifies intermediaries as 
enablers, as they play a significant role for successful implementation of sustainability strategies 
across the supply chain. A study by ITC (2016) concludes that intermediaries play a gatekeeper 
role as they ensure the bridging of various supply chain actors. In contrast, interviewed informants 
indicated that intermediaries constitute a barrier to traceability of 3T minerals. Intermediaries are 
mostly not registered/licensed. They are generally used by licensed traders to secure material. 
According to informants, in most cases intermediaries supply material from undocumented 
sources. Once this material is mixed with those from qualified sources, the attributes of minerals, 
including the origin, become difficult to establish.  
To summarize, identified barriers to traceability include institutional barriers, such as the DRC’s 
lack of capacity and resources, lack of transparency, monopoly, technology and cost; contextual 
barriers, which include infrastructure and logistics, insecurity, and deficient law enforcement; and 
people-related barriers, such as corruption, mixing of undocumented material, and tag trafficking. 
Among the ten identified barriers, six compare with extant literature, and four are new findings 
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specific to the conflict minerals context: 1) monopoly, 2) insecurity, 3) lack of law enforcement 
and 4) infrastructure and logistics. These findings have not been discussed in previous studies.  
5.3 Opportunities for Improvement 
The results of the interviews show that informants are fully aware of the barriers to traceability, 
which would ultimately require some degree of improvement. Based on the findings, this study 
suggests that 3T minerals traceability as currently implemented requires a new approach, which is 
supported by policies that take into consideration the identified barriers. Proposed opportunities 
for improvement are derived from the most significant barriers (Table 5.1.). 
Table 5.1. Four opportunities for improvement.  
Barriers ranking from 9 to 4 were considered as areas needing improvement. 
 
Barrier             Improvement required 
DRC lack of capacity and 
resources  
 Escalate capacity and resources in the DRC. 
Lack of transparency   Redesign information/data sharing agreement. 
Monopoly   Transition from monopoly to competitive market 
approach 
Manual/paper-based 
tracking system  
 Upgrade tracking technology 
 
Escalate the DRC capacity and resources. As seen in the results, the DRC’s lack of capacity and 
resources ranked highest among all the barrier to 3T minerals traceability. Being the key 
implementer of traceability in the 3T minerals supply chain in the DRC, the DRC government is 
expected to rise to the challenge by escalating its capacity and resources using enforceable policies. 
Escalating the DRC government capacity means that existing policies on artisanal mining and 
conflict minerals traceability must be redefined and rationalized according to the identified 
barriers.  
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Redesign information sharing agreement. Transparency is seen as a significant aspect of 
traceability (Donnelly & Karlsen, 2010; Thompson et al., 2005). Upstream supply chain actors 
expected to see minerals information for data comparison purposes. Other informants pointed out 
that iTSCi makes information public online. However, it is not known whether the information 
posted online is substantial and reflects the actual information collected on the ground. To ensure 
transparency and foster trust and communication, the ICGLR, the DRC and iTSCi should redesign 
the information sharing agreement. 
Transition from monopoly to competitive market approach. One of the frustrations 
interviewed informants expressed was that ITRI association members, that is smelters, effectively 
control all 3T minerals in the region. In the DRC, 3T minerals trade is a closed market. It is 
acknowledged, however that iTSCi traceability system helps local suppliers to access the 
international market. Nevertheless, interviewees believed that bringing in competitors to iTSCi 
would foster improvement in traceability outcomes via competitive service delivery. To ensure 
quality traceability service, the ICGLR and the DRC government should take the initiative to bring 
in other traceability providers.  
Upgrade tracking technology. According to Karlsen, Donnelly and Olsen (2011), using advanced 
technology for product traceability is of great value in that it provides efficient and reliable data 
recordings and transfer. In the context of traceability of conflict minerals in the Eastern DRC, the 
manual recording technology currently employed meets minimum requirements; however, 
interviewed informants pointed out significant drawbacks related to this technology (Table 3.3.). 
With advances in technology, iTSCi should be able to upgrade the data recording system to ensure 
efficiency and reliability of traceability data.  
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5.4 Contributions to Literature 
A significant body of scholarship has discussed factors impacting implementation and 
participation in traceability of diverse product supply chains. This study identified lack of 
understanding of factors affecting traceability of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa, and specifically the DRC. The present study has addressed the gap by identifying the 
drivers and barriers precluding effective traceability. This study opens an area of investigation into 
conflict minerals traceability research. The study can serve as a blueprint, which can be used to 
examine traceability of minerals in other contexts. This study contributes as well to the debate on 
factors impacting traceability of product, as it substantiates the understanding of drivers and 
barriers to traceability of products. One finding shows that the internal driver, which pertains to 
market access, is perceived as a greater motivation for participation compared to external drivers 
pertaining to legal requirement and social pressure. In addition, the study demonstrated that 
barriers to traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC are institutional, contextual and people-driven. 
The original contribution made by this study is in the finding of four barriers specific to traceability 
of 3T minerals in the DRC using the GT approach: 1) Insecurity, which relates to the presence of 
armed groups, 2) infrastructure and logistics, 3) monopoly and 4) weak/lack of law enforcement.  
This study provides a new insight on the understanding of barriers to traceability by establishing a 
relationship of causality between barriers and their underlying causes: who or what is responsible 
for creating and maintaining each barrier is revealed. Knowing the background behind various 
barriers provides insight into how they may be addressed. This study therefore contributes to the 
traceability of products literature. 
  
  
76 
 
5.5 Application to Industry 
Understanding factors that impact traceability in conflict minerals supply chain is of great 
significance to the industry seeking to source minerals from legitimate origins and avoid conflict-
related material. This study provides insights on aspects needing improvement by identifying 
barriers hindering the proper course of traceability. If identified barriers are addressed accordingly, 
the industry, downstream in particular, could be assured of the legitimacy of attributes of the 
minerals they purchase. In addition, the findings of this study regarding barriers inhibiting 
traceability of 3T minerals, and the subsequent strategies/recommendations proposed to address 
them as opportunities for improvement, can stand as an example for the broader minerals trade, 
and potentially for other industries as well. Mining operations in other conflict-plagued regions 
may experience similar challenges, and therefore find the solutions proposed within to be a highly 
applicable road map for positive change. Even industries operating in places where conflict and 
human rights abuses are not prominent issues may gain insight into certain problems they face, 
and may even be able to use this research as a guide towards productive resolutions. 
5.6 Limitations of the Research 
The main limitation of this study is sample size and make-up of the group of key informants 
interviewed. Conflict minerals, specifically 3T minerals, are traded in a complex global supply 
chain involving various actors spread all over the world; thus, finding and securing informants was 
a challenge. The sample size of ten informants included two in-chain and eight out-of-chain 
informants, limits the general reliability of results. Given the spectrum of the 3T minerals supply 
chain, a larger sample size would have been much better. However, recognizing this limitation, 
the interviewed informants provided high quality information, which was carefully combed 
through. The information gleaned from informants was used to maximum effect, including as 
many relevant quotes as possible. In addition, new insights into 3T minerals traceability supply 
chains were obtained. 
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The second limitation of the study was found to be the scarcity of scholarly literature on traceability 
of conflict minerals. Despite the limitations, this study is nonetheless a step towards better 
understanding an under-researched domain.  
5.7 Direction for Future Research 
Traceability of conflict minerals is at its early stage. The findings of this first study in this area of 
research indicate a wealth of possibilities for future research endeavors. The most prominent of 
these are listed below. 
1) Given the fact that this study is the first of its kind, and considering the small sample size 
used to carry out this study, there is a need to re-evaluate the identified factors impacting 
traceability in 3T minerals using a larger sample size in order to improve the findings.  
2) Subsequent studies would benefit from expanding the scope of investigation from mine 
site to OEMs in order to have the downstream supply chain actors’ perspective on drivers 
and barriers to traceability of conflict minerals. 
3) Given that barriers to traceability of 3T minerals are intrinsically linked to institutions, 
context and people, it would be interesting to investigate how these three areas intersect 
and impact each other.  
4) Given that market access, which translates into economic interest, was unanticipatedly 
found to be the major driver that motivates participation, it would be important to explore 
the economic impact of traceability of 3T minerals on the DRC. Such a research would 
seek to understand whether the DRC, specifically mining communities have improved 
economically. 
 
  
78 
 
: Conclusion  
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to understand the factors impacting traceability of conflict minerals in 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in the DRC in particular, and identify potential opportunities 
for improvement. Previous studies have focused on drivers and barriers to traceability in food, 
agricultural and fish/seafood products. No studies addressing factors impacting traceability of 
conflict minerals were found. This study sought to understand drivers that motivate participation, 
and barriers inhibiting traceability of conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region, and in the DRC 
in particular. To address the research question and objectives of the study, grounded theory was 
employed using semi-structured interviews. Two core open-ended questions were asked to ten in-
chain and out-of-chain informants. The results show that participation in traceability of 3T 
minerals in driven by legal requirement, market access, and social pressure. The results also 
indicate that ten main barriers hamper traceability of 3T minerals in the DRC: DRC’s lack of 
capacity and resources, lack of transparency, and monopoly, technology, cost, and infrastructure 
and logistics, lack of law enforcement, insecurity and misrepresentation of origin, and corruption. 
The present study has furthered the understanding of factors impacting traceability of product 
across supply chains by identifying drivers for participation, and barriers inhibiting traceability of 
3T minerals. Main findings of the study and recommendations to policy makers and industry are 
provided in the next sections. Section 6.2 recapitulates the major findings of the study. Section 6.3 
provides recommendations to policy makers and industry. 
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6.2 Main findings 
The present study is the first to address drivers and barriers to traceability in 3T minerals supply 
chain. Interviewed informants clearly indicated key reasons for participation, and major barriers 
to traceability. The most prominent findings are provided below. 
1. It is acknowledged that the DFA and social pressure played a significant role in the 
adoption and implementation of traceability in conflict minerals supply chain, informants 
indicated that their participation in traceability of 3T minerals is driven by market access. 
2. The vast majority of informants felt that the most prominent barriers to traceability include 
the DRC’s lack of capacity and resources, iTSCi’s lack of transparency, monopoly, 
technology, and cost. 
3. The study found that identified barriers to traceability are institutional, contextual and 
people-driven.  
4. Apart from identified barriers to traceability of conflict minerals in the DRC, this study 
found four barriers that are not found in the existing body of literature: insecurity, 
infrastructure and logistics, monopoly, and weak/lack of law enforcement. 
5. Although, intermediaries are considered as enablers in the existing literature, this study 
found that intermediaries constitute a barrier to traceability. According to informants, 
intermediaries who are used by official/licensed traders bring material from unknown 
sources into the legal supply chain.  
6.3 Recommendations to Policy makers and Industry 
This study provides recommendations based on its findings to policy makers and to industry.  
Recommendation to policy makers. As demonstrated by the results of this study, responsibility 
for the bulk of barriers to traceability rests with the DRC government. The DRC government and 
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the ICGLR should adjust and rationalize existing policies in light of the identified institutional and 
contextual barriers. Specifically, the ICGLR’s RCM could use the findings of this study to devise 
policies that would help ensure transparency on minerals origin, CoC compliance and regional 
supply chain monitoring. Informants felt that intermediaries are unnecessary in the 3T minerals 
supply chain. Thus the need to improve the structure of the supply chain. In order to streamline 
the structure of the supply chain, the DRC government in particular needs to draw up policies that 
eliminate intermediaries. There is also a need for the DRC government to set up policies able to 
enforce the law over artisanal mining and traceability of minerals; this would help control people-
driven barriers.  Lastly, in order to reduce tag trafficking, the DRC government needs to devise 
policies that require accountability of tracking services.  
Recommendation to industry. The findings of this study show the limitation of the DRC 
government resources, and the deficient funding for traceability implementation in the DRC. There 
is therefore a need for downstream industry to increase their participation in funding in order to 
ensure improved traceability. In addition, given the chaos observed at the trading level, where 
material from unknown sources are infiltrated in the legal supply chain via intermediaries, 
exporters/international trader can, for example, adopt the closed-pipe system. This approach 
directly connects an international trader/exporter with miners at a qualified conflict-free mine of 
origin. This type of supply chain has been implemented by Kemet since 2010 (Kemet, n. d.). Kemet 
is a US-based electronic components manufacturer. By using the closed-pipe supply chain, Kemet 
has succeeded to avoid intermediaries by directly trading in minerals at the mine level. The 
advantage of a closed-pipe supply chain is that it allows downstream actors/firms to ensure 
verifiable conflict-free status of their products.  
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Appendix A: Open-ended questions for interview 
 
1. What are the drivers that motivate supply chain actors to participate in 3T minerals 
traceability system? 
2. Based on your experience, identify and describe the barriers that hinder traceability of 3T 
minerals in the Eastern DRC.  
 
 
  
  
104 
 
Appendix B: Sample of open coding for drivers 
Excerpts from interviews/Raw data            Code 
I02. DFA1502 pressure led US consumer companies to use market 
influence to change the behavior of suppliers. Sometimes 
consumers’ demands have an impact, but they do not really 
change things in the same way that the law does. 
 Dodd-Franck Act 1502 
 Market influence 
I05. Companies participate in 3Ts traceability to meet market 
requirement for traceable material 
 Market requirement 
I06. Traceability was imposed by DFA. If we do not follow what 
the law prescribes, we won’t be able to sell and export our materials 
 Ability to sell and export 
I07. It is the Dodd-Frank Act 1502 that was signed into law in 2010 
by the US government. Industry was required by the DFA to report 
that their business has nothing to do with the conflict in the region. 
 Dodd-Frank Act 
I07. There is also civil society organizations that played an 
important role on the industry to make the industry more 
responsible and transparent in the way they operate in the region. 
 Civil society 
I09. Another driver is social pressure. A lot of sustainability is 
driven by customers wanting to buy sustainable products. However, 
it is really hard to understand how much that is a driver. 
 Social pressure 
 Customer/consumer demand 
09. Even though it is not a legal requirement in all countries, is only 
in the US, the supply chains are still big now that most companies 
are involved and requiring their supplier to be able to trace their 
minerals. So it is driving participation in supply chain traceability.    
 Legal requirement 
I07. There is also the market requirement, miners, exporters cannot 
sell or export their minerals if there are not traceable. Upstream SC 
actors are to satisfy the demand of downstream firms, needing 
traceable material. 
 Market requirement 
I08. Having traceable minerals will help a lot of artisanal miners to 
sell at a better price, and therefore secure a better income 
 To sell at better price 
 To secure income 
I03. The activities by civil society about being responsible in supply 
chains is key. Legal and market requirements are, to a certain extent, 
reflecting the public opinion. 
 Civil society 
 Legal requirement 
 Market requirement 
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Appendix C: Sample of axial coding for drivers 
New code             Collation of similar codes 
Legal requirement  DFA 1502 
 Legal requirement 
Social pressure  Civil society 
 Social pressure 
 Consumer demand 
Market access  Market influence 
 Market requirement 
 Ability to sell and export 
 To sell at better price 
 To ensure income 
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Appendix D: Sample of open coding for barriers 
Excerpts from Interviews/ Raw data            Code 
I04. ITSCi is a complete black box; there is no transparency whatsoever. It 
was the intent of the ICGLR standards to have a great deal of transparency 
in terms of mineral flows. ITSCi has in fact provided no transparent 
information whatsoever in terms of where the minerals come from, how they 
are supplied, where they go. 
 ITSCi lack of 
transparency 
I04. There is no oversight over iTSCi scheme. It is held privately and 
exclusively. There is no information exchange.   
 No information 
exchange (iTSCi) 
I04. There are a couple of barriers to minerals traceability. First, lack of 
traceability competition. Second, lack of capacity of governments/ member 
states.  
 Lack of competition 
 DRC government 
lack of capacity  
I07. Cost related to running 3T minerals traceability system is a serious 
concern. The system employs a lot of services and personal that need to be 
paid.  
 A lot of service 
needing to be paid 
I02. We have covered most of the easily accessible areas. There are still areas 
where we would like to work, where we have not done yet which is partly 
down to security; to some parts still have a lot of insecurity which is 
challenging because it means we can’t get to those sites. 
 A lot of Insecurity 
I02. Government agents involved in mineral identification and data 
collection are not necessarily being paid on time, or not being paid at all 
which is very demotivating for them.  
I06. The status of verified mine sites is made public. Intermediary traders are 
supposed to buy minerals from verified mines. However, many intermediaries do 
not. They buy minerals from any sources, verified or not. This factor present a 
barrier to traceability of minerals. 
I04. It is known that at the trader’s level, the “negociants”/intermediaries are 
bringing in materials from other mine sites that have not been qualified. They mix 
this stuff with minerals from verified mines. However, nothing has been envisaged 
to prevent that to happen by the current system. 
 Unpaid tracking 
agents 
 
 Intermediaries buy 
material from nay 
sources 
 
 Mixing of material 
from non-qualified 
mines 
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Appendix E: Sample of axial coding for barriers 
New code Collation of similar codes 
Transparency  ITSCi lack of transparency 
 No information exchange (iTSCi) 
Monopoly  Lack of competition 
Cost  A lot of services needing to be paid 
Insecurity  A lot of insecurity 
DRG government lack of capacity and 
resources 
Misrepresentation of origin 
 DRC government lack of capacity 
 Unpaid tracking agents 
 Mixing of undocumented material  
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Appendix F: Sample of selective coding 
Category Code 
Institutional  
 
  
 Transparency (iTSCi) 
 Monopoly 
  Cost 
 Lack of capacity and resources (DRC 
government) 
Contextual  Insecurity 
People-driven  Misrepresentation of origin 
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Appendix G: Sample of verbatim quotations 
Informant Sample quotation 
I01 For without any type of traceability, we will be in a position where we will not be able to export our 
minerals. Therefore full traceability was required, from the mine to the upgrading plant, including 
transport. 
I01 Lack of competition is a significant barrier to 3Ts traceability and transparency. If iTSCi had competition 
of any type, we would look at all irregularities going on in the system and say, hold on a second, you are 
not doing your job properly, I am going to move to someone else. Yet, right now the fact is, without them 
we can’t sell our minerals. 
I02 Sometimes consumers’ demands have an impact. The very creation of DFA was partly brushed due to 
consumer pressure. Consumer pressure came from a very strong lobby that was led by various NGOs. 
I03 ITSCi/Pact are continuously improving as to how to manage the scheme. The challenge for the DRC is the 
lack of capacity to efficiently manage the scheme. In other words, the DRC has a big problem for data 
management. 
I04 The current traceability scheme is a complete black box; that is, there is no transparency whatsoever. It 
was the intent of the ICGLR standards to have a great deal of transparency in terms of mineral flows, and 
publication of data from minerals flows. However, ITSCi has in fact provided no transparent information 
whatsoever in terms of where the minerals come from, how they are supplied, where they go. 
I06 The status of verified mine sites is made public. Intermediary traders are supposed to buy minerals from 
verified mines. However, many intermediaries do not. They buy minerals from any sources, verified or 
not. This factor present a barrier to traceability of minerals. 
I04 It is known that at the trader’s level, the “negociants”/intermediaries are bringing in materials from other 
mine sites that have not been qualified. They mix this stuff with minerals from verified mines. However, 
nothing has been envisaged to prevent that to happen by the current system. 
I02 There a growing concern with government agents who are not necessarily being paid on time, or not being 
paid at all. This factor is very demotivating for them. So even though iTSCi provides training and support 
to government agents, there are still issues with people not getting paid. 
I03 The challenge of the traceability system as currently implemented is that you have two different parties 
involved in implementation of the system.  First, ITRI and Pact. They are at the same time owners and 
operators or managers of the scheme. Second, you have the DRC government. 
I06 ITSCI does not share its information. ITSCI knows that often there is no correspondence between the output 
of a mine and the number of people working in the mine. But no action is taken. The biggest problem is that 
there is no body to check on ITSCI. ITSCI is not accountable to anybody.  
I07 Monopoly is one of the barriers to traceability. In reality, there is a double monopoly here. Monopoly in 
providing traceability services, but also monopoly of market at the international level because now ITRI 
has like 70-80% of smelters who are members. These sourced materials are traced and tracked only by 
iTSCi which means that ITRI has as well a monopoly in the international market. Not any other traceability 
provider can access this 70-80% of smelters at the international level.  
I10 We participate for economic gain. If we do not participate in traceability system we can’t sell nor export 
our minerals. 
 
 
